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Century 
Jay A. Soled 
Mitchell M. Gans 
Abstract 
For the vast majority of the twentieth century, trusts served 
two pivotal roles. The first was as a vehicle to help mitigate 
federal and state estate tax burdens, the rates of which could be 
quite significant. The second was to assist in asset preservation, 
safeguarding trust beneficiaries from their profligacy, former 
spouses, creditors, and the like.  
At the start of the twenty-first century, Congress passed 
legislation that curtailed the impact of the federal estate tax, and 
many state legislatures have followed suit, either eliminating or 
significantly reducing their estate taxes. As a result of these 
legislative changes, trust instrument reliance to mitigate transfer 
tax burdens is no longer a commonplace objective. Instead, the role 
of trusts has shifted entirely toward asset preservation, buoyed by 
state legislative reforms that facilitate fulfillment of this role. 
However, state legislative reform measures that are designed 
to strengthen the asset preservation element of trusts are replete 
with problems. In particular, they drain government coffers as 
they pit states against one another and the federal government; 
furthermore, insofar as they promote an aristocracy-like 
environment (where wealth cascades down from one generation to 
the next), they thwart economic mobility, an essential component 
of our nation’s financial fabric.  
Using three specific examples of states’ aggressive efforts to 
attract trust formation within their borders, this analysis 
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demonstrates the shortcomings associated with the evolving role of 
trusts in asset preservation and its corrosive effects. Because too 
much is at stake for this role to be left unchecked, this analysis 
recommends several viable reforms.  
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I. Introduction 
Over the past decade, Congress has devitalized the federal 
estate tax,1 relegating it to almost complete obscurity. As 
currently formulated, it only burdens approximately 0.14% of the 
U.S. population.2 Moreover, the vast majority of state 
governments has followed the lead of the federal government, in 
many instances even going a step further and entirely 
eliminating their estate taxes.3 These actions by the federal 
                                                                                                     
 1. See, e.g., Grayson M.P. McCouch, The Empty Promise of Estate Tax 
Repeal, 28 VA. TAX REV. 369, 370 (2008) (“The 2001 Act provides sizable income 
and estate tax cuts over a protracted phase-in period, culminating in 2010 with 
repeal of the estate tax and introduction of a modified carryover basis system for 
inherited property.”); Daniel W. Matthews, A Fight to the Death: Slaying the 
Estate Tax Repeal Hydra, 28 WHITTIER L. REV. 663, 665 (2006) (acknowledging 
that estate tax critics have been hugely successful in their campaign against the 
estate tax); Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Estate Tax Repeal: 
Through the Looking Glass, 22 VA. TAX REV. 187 (2002) (explaining how 
Congress, in 2001, greatly weakened the federal transfer tax system). 
 2. See Chye-Ching Huang & Nathaniel Frentz, Myths and Realities About 
the Estate Tax, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES (Aug. 29, 2013), 
http://www.cbpp.org/archiveSite/estatetaxmyths.pdf (indicating that in 2013 
only 1.4 people out of 1,000 taxpayers endured the federal estate tax). 
 3. See Ashlea Ebeling, Where Not to Die in 2014: The Changing Wealth 
Tax Landscape, FORBES (Nov. 1, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
ashleaebeling/2013/11/01/where-not-to-die-in-2014-the-changing-wealth-tax-
landscape/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2015) (indicating that only nineteen states and 
the District of Columbia still retain state estate taxes) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). See generally Jeffrey A. Cooper, John R. 
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government and state legislatures have led to a fundamental 
shift in the estate planning landscape. Simply put, most 
taxpayers no longer need to retain legal counsel to circumvent 
estate taxes that in their heyday had tax rates—at least at the 
federal level—ranging as high as 77%.4  
In the aftermath of the estate tax upheaval,5 to stay relevant, 
the estate planning bar is struggling to reinvent itself. This is no 
easy task. Its membership has had to rethink the role of trusts 
and the objectives that they can achieve.6 In the past, trusts were 
often employed as powerful shields to protect taxpayer wealth 
from the estate tax.7 As the estate tax has waned at both the 
federal and state levels,8 however, this objective has largely been 
rendered a nullity. Estate planners have thus had to reformulate 
the role of trust instruments, placing much greater emphasis on 
their second historical objective, namely, asset preservation.9 
                                                                                                     
Ivimey & Donna D. Vincenti, State Estate Taxes After EGTRRA: A Long Day’s 
Journey into the Night, 17 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 90 (2003) (explaining how in 
the aftermath of congressional repeal of state death tax credit, many state 
legislatures simply let their estate taxes lapse); Joel Michael, State Responses to 
EGTRRA Estate Tax Changes, 103 TAX NOTES 1023 (2004) (cataloging state tax 
policy changes in the wake of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act of 2001). 
 4. See Darien B. Jacobson, Brian G. Raub & Barry W. Johnson, The Estate 
Tax: Ninety Years and Counting, 27 STAT. INCOME BULL., 118, 122 fig.D 
(Summer 2007), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/ninetyestate.pdf (showing the top 
tax rates from 1916 to 2007). 
 5. See infra Part II (discussing the historical context of the estate tax and 
its current state, which shows the drastic change). 
 6. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Cooper, Interstate Competition and State Death 
Taxes: A Modern Crisis in Historical Perspective, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 835 (2006) 
(describing the new estate tax landscape).   
 7. See infra Part II.A (discussing the estate tax prior to 2001). 
 8. See infra Part II.B (looking at the changes made in 2001 and 
developments since then). 
 9. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 25–33 (1959) (discussing the 
creation of a trust); ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS § 1 (2d ed. 1947) 
(discussing trusts as a way to keep large estates intact); AUSTIN W. SCOTT & 
WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 151 (4th ed. 1987) (describing the 
transfer of interest by means of a trust). See generally Lawrence M. Friedman, 
The Dynastic Trust, 73 YALE L.J. 547 (1964) (providing a history of trust law in 
the United States); George P. Costigan Jr., Those Protective Trusts Which Are 
Miscalled “Spendthrift Trusts” Reexamined, 22 CAL. L. REV. 471 (1934) (looking 
at the role of spendthrift trusts in the concentrated accumulation of wealth). 
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Consistent with achieving this objective, the estate planning 
bar has aggressively lobbied state legislatures to pass legislation 
that emphasizes trust asset preservation.10 Many state 
legislatures have been compliant, enabling estate planners to 
design trusts to achieve numerous asset preservation goals, 
including the ability to mitigate and, in some instances, defeat 
state income taxes; safeguard assets within bloodlines for 
multiple generations; and offer significant shelter from 
creditors.11 This emerging trend in the area of trust law has 
important, negative consequences for federal and state 
governments—consequences that require immediate attention.12 
 This analysis proceeds as follows. Part II provides estate tax 
historical background, including those events that over the past 
decade have gutted this tax.13 Part III then details how, in the 
aftermath of the estate tax evisceration, the estate planning bar 
has responded by enlisting state legislatures to pass laws that 
facilitate trust asset preservation and then designing trusts that 
can fulfill this role.14 Next, Part IV pinpoints the consequences 
associated with this emerging trend and suggests measures that 
the federal and state governments should institute to protect 
their tax bases from erosion and to secure other public policy 
objectives.15 Finally, Part V concludes.16 
                                                                                                     
 10. See infra Part III (“In particular, they are reexamining trust 
instruments and transforming the roles that such trusts can potentially play in 
the twenty-first century.”). 
 11. See infra Part III (examining how weaker estate taxes have frequently 
led to more onerous state income taxes). 
 12. See infra Part III (looking at how trusts can be used to avoid income 
taxation). 
 13. See infra Part II (providing relevant historical context to the 
forthcoming discussion of the estate tax). 
 14. See infra Part III (discussing the response to the weakening of the 
estate tax). 
 15. See infra Part IV (addressing the result of these changing policies and 
proposing a solution). 
 16. See infra Part V (concluding with a summary of the concerns regarding 
the use of trusts to circumvent estate and income taxes). 
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II. Historical Background  
The vibrancy of yesteryear’s federal and state estate taxes 
compared with their current limited impact signifies how the 
estate planning landscape has changed.17 Subpart A sets forth a 
short historical overview of the federal estate tax and its state 
law counterparts prior to 2001. Subpart B then details how 
legislative changes in 2001 and the years following have largely 
emasculated the federal and state estate taxes. 
A. Overview of the Pre-2001 Federal Estate Tax and State Law 
Counterparts 
The federal estate tax owes its origin to the Revenue Act of 
1916.18 This legislation initiated what was then a modest tax.19 
With a $50,000 exemption, it applied only to what were then the 
wealthiest estates.20 Moreover, the applicable tax rates were 
graduated in nature, ranging from 1% on the first $50,000 beyond 
the exemption amount to 10% on the portion exceeding $5 
million.21  
To complement the estate tax and ensure the integrity of its 
base, Congress introduced the federal gift tax in 1924.22 In 1926, 
Congress repealed this tax23 but reintroduced it in 1932.24 With a 
rate structure that was somewhat akin to that of the estate tax 
and a lifetime exclusion of $50,000, this tax applied to inter vivos 
gratuitous transfers.25 Congress also provided an annual 
                                                                                                     
 17. See infra Part II.A (detailing the historical context of the estate tax, 
which serves to demonstrate how much it has weakened over time). 
 18. See Pub. L. No. 64-271, 39 Stat. 756 (providing for a tax on income 
received by estates). 
 19. See id. § 200 (setting the highest estate tax rate at 10%). 
 20. See id. (taxing estates under $50,000 at just 1%). 
 21. See id. (providing estate tax rates for estates ranging from $50,000 to 
over $5 million). 
 22. See Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, 43 Stat. 313 (providing for 
a tax on property received as a gift). 
 23. See Revenue Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-20, 44 Stat. 126 (repealing the 
gift tax). 
 24. See Revenue Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-154, 47 Stat. 169 (imposing a 
gift tax and setting forth calculations for that tax). 
 25. See Jeffrey A. Cooper, Ghosts of 1932: The Lost History of Estate and 
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exclusion, enabling taxpayers to transfer up to $5,000 per donee 
free of gift tax or the use of their lifetime exclusion.26 
Notwithstanding the estate tax’s modest beginnings, the 
country’s need for revenue and the Second World War led to a 
series of legislative initiatives resulting in the imposition of a 
more vigorous estate tax.27 In 1932, Congress passed legislation 
that raised the highest estate tax rates from 20% to 45% and 
lowered the exemption amount from $100,000 back to $50,000.28 
In 1934, Congress passed legislation that again raised the highest 
estate tax rate, this time from 45% to 60%;29 and in 1935, 
Congress raised the highest estate tax rate from 60% to 70% and 
even lowered the exemption amount to $40,000.30 Finally, in 
1941, Congress passed legislation that raised the highest federal 
estate tax rate from 70% to 77% while maintaining the exemption 
amount at $40,000.31 
In 1976, the federal estate tax received a legislative 
complement in the form of the generation-skipping transfer 
(GST) tax.32 This new transfer tax was designed to curtail 
                                                                                                     
Gift Taxation, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 875, 897 (2010) (discussing the effect of the 
Revenue Act of 1932, which exposed more estates to taxation). 
 26. The 1932 Act clarified that the exclusion was calculated on a per-donee, 
per-calendar-year basis. More specifically, Section 504(b) of the Act provided 
that “[i]n the case of gifts (other than future interests in property) made to any 
person by the donor during the calendar year, the first $5,000 of such gifts to 
such person shall not, for purposes of subsection (a), be included in the total 
amount of gifts made during such year.” Revenue Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-
154, 47 Stat. 169. Note that from 1943 through 1981, the annual exclusion 
amount was $3,000. Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, § 454, 56 Stat. 
798, 953. 
 27. As Congress strengthened the estate tax, it also instituted measures 
designed to strengthen the gift tax. See DAVID JOULFAIAN, OFFICE OF TAX 
ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, OTA 100, THE FEDERAL GIFT TAX: 
HISTORY, LAW, AND ECONOMICS (Nov. 2007), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/tax-policy/tax-analysis/docu ments/ota100.pdf (describing changes taken 
by Congress). 
 28. See Revenue Act of 1932 § 403 (requiring a tax whenever the decedent’s 
estate exceeds $50,000).  
 29. See Revenue Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-216, 48 Stat. 680 (providing 
estate tax rates). 
 30. See Revenue Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-407, 49 Stat. 1014 § 201 
(raising the estate tax rates and changing the criteria for exemption). 
 31. See Revenue Act of 1941, Pub. L. No. 77-250, 55 Stat. 687 § 401 (setting 
estate tax rates). 
 32. See generally A. MacDonough Plant & Lynn Wintriss, Generation-
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taxpayers from gifting and devising assets to distant generations, 
outright or in trust, forestalling estate tax imposition for years 
and even decades.33 On a going-forward basis, taxpayers who 
made gifts or bequests to so-called skip people (generally, 
grandchildren and more distant descendents)34 beyond a 
statutory set exemption amount35 had to pay, in addition to gift 
and estate taxes, the GST tax. The GST tax has a flat rate equal 
to the highest federal estate tax rate.36  
As the federal estate tax (along with its gift and GST tax 
counterparts) gradually became broader based in nature, many 
state legislatures during this same time period took steps to 
augment their revenues, choosing a path similar to that of the 
federal government.37 Consider the fact that in 1924 Congress 
enacted the so-called state death tax credit.38 Up to certain dollar 
thresholds, this credit enabled taxpayers’ estates to offset dollar-
for-dollar their federal estate tax liability equal to amounts paid 
to state governments.39 With this federal legislative framework in 
place, many state governments quickly enacted estate tax laws 
                                                                                                     
Skipping Transfer Tax, 17 U. BALT. L. REV. 271 (1988) (discussing legislative 
attempts to ensure that a tax is imposed on trusts at least once a generation); 
Joseph M. Dodge, Generation-Skipping Transfers After the Tax Reform Act of 
1976, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1265 (1977) (discussing the impact of the Tax Reform 
Act of 1976 on generation-skipping taxes). In 1986, Congress retroactively 
repealed the generation-skipping transfer tax, replacing it with the version 
currently in effect. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1431, 100 
Stat. 2085, 2717–32 (1986). 
 33. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL 
EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, at 564–65 (Comm. Print 1976) 
(discussing the motivations for changing the federal estate tax law). 
 34. See I.R.C. § 2613(a) (1988) (defining a skip person for purposes of a 
generation-skipping transfer). 
 35. See id. § 2631(c) (setting forth exemptions from a generation-skipping 
transfer). 
 36. See id. § 2641(a) (setting the applicable rate equal to the highest federal 
estate tax rate). 
 37. See E.M. Perkins, State Action Under the Federal Estate Tax Credit 
Clause, 13 N.C. L. REV. 271, 280 n.33 (1934) (discussing state laws providing for 
an estate tax). 
 38. See Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, § 301(b), 43 Stat. 253, 304 
§ 216 (providing tax credits to a surviving spouse in the year following his or her 
spouse’s death).  
 39. See I.R.C. § 2011(a) (2002) (providing tax credits for estate taxes paid to 
a state). 
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designed to absorb this credit because it came at no added cost to 
their constituents.40 
While exemption amounts and tax rates fluctuated prior to 
2001,41 federal and state estate taxes remained a salient part of 
the tax landscape.42 Beyond the applicable exemption amount 
(which from 1942 to 1976 stayed constant at a modest $60,000),43 
the combined federal and state estate tax rates consistently 
exceeded 50%, claiming significant portions of wealthy taxpayers’ 
estates.44 The modest exemption amount combined with the 
severity of such federal and state estate tax rates constituted a 
constant driving force toward comprehensive estate planning for 
many taxpayers.45 
Naturally, the estate planning bar did whatever it could to 
keep transfer tax severity in the public limelight and to 
emphasize taxpayers’ need for legal counsel.46 Estate planners 
routinely warned clients that improperly planned estates had the 
potential for significant estate tax exposure.47 Indeed, these 
planners routinely exploited examples of assets inuring to the 
benefit of grandchildren that triggered multiple-transfer-tax 
application (i.e., both the estate and GST taxes) and resulted in 
an aggregate transfer tax rate as high as 90%.48 Whether these 
                                                                                                     
 40. See Perkins, supra note 37, at 280 n.33 (detailing those states that 
adopted an estate tax in the aftermath of federal legislation). 
 41. See Jacobson, Raub & Johnson, supra note 4, at 122 (providing estate 
tax rates from 1916 to 1977). 
 42. See id. at 122–24 (providing historical context of the estate tax). 
 43. See id. at 122 (providing estate tax rates from 1916 to 1977).  
 44. See id. (showing that, despite fluctuations, the top rate was almost 
always above 50%).  
 45. See id. at 121–24 (discussing past estate tax regimes, under which 
many more estates were exposed to taxation). 
 46. See AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, ESTATE PLANNING 4, 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/publiced/practical/books/
family_legal_guide/chapter_16.authcheckda.pdf (encouraging the use of an 
attorney in estate planning). 
 47. See id. at 27–28 (discussing the potential for estate tax exposure, 
including the methods of asset valuation upon death).  
 48. See generally Top Four Reasons You Need an Estate Planning Attorney, 
FOWLER ST. CLAIR (Nov. 15, 2013), http://www.fowlerstclair.com/top-four-
reasons-need-estate-planning-attorney/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2015) (listing one 
reason to see an estate planning attorney as having “enough assets to worry 
about the so-called ‘death tax’”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); Evelyn Zawatasky, Ten Reasons You Need to See an Estate Planning 
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frightful scenarios would actually materialize was irrelevant; 
they motivated taxpayers to act.  
Because of the high stakes, taxpayers were often willing to 
dedicate a lot of resources in the form of legal fees to safeguard 
their estates from transfer tax. Tax counsel accordingly 
developed a plethora of tax-saving techniques, the vast 
majority of which employed trust utilization.49 Some of these 
tax-saving techniques involving trusts could be employed 
during taxpayers’ lifetimes and were designed to keep 
insurance proceeds out of their estates,50 maximize valuation 
discounts,51 and leverage their annual exclusions;52 some of 
these tax-saving techniques involving trusts were 
testamentary in nature and, among other things, were 
                                                                                                     
Attorney, ZAWATSKY LAW (Feb. 9, 2014), http://www.zawatskylaw.com/10-
reasons-need-see-estate-planning-attorney/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2015) 
(including the possibility of estate taxes as a reason to see an estate planning 
attorney) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 49. See, e.g., C. Daniel Yates & Michael O. Chenoweth, Estate Planning: 
The Use of Irrevocable Insurance Trusts, 23 IND. L. REV. 517, 517 (1990) 
(discussing the use of trusts in estate planning). 
 50. See, e.g., id. (“An irrevocable trust funded with life insurance provides 
the opportunity to create wealth for the benefit of the settlor’s family without 
the imposition of federal estate tax and to provide liquidity for the estate of the 
settlor.”). For a historic examination of the early use of irrevocable life insurance 
trusts, see Note, Federal Taxation of Personal Life Insurance Trusts, 44 YALE 
L.J. 1409, 1415–21 (1935) (looking at the use of trusts in avoiding estate 
taxation). 
 51. See James R. Repetti, Minority Discounts: The Alchemy in Estate and 
Gift Taxation, 50 TAX L. REV. 415, 431–32 (1995) (discussing ways that 
valuation methods might be used to lower estate and gift taxes); Mary Louise 
Fellows & William H. Painter, Valuing Close Corporations for Federal Wealth 
Transfer Taxes: A Statutory Solution to the Disappearing Wealth Syndrome, 30 
STAN. L. REV. 895, 913 (1978) (looking at a case that addressed valuation as a 
way to reduce gift taxes); Alan L. Feld, The Implications of Minority Interest and 
Stock Restrictions in Valuing Closely-Held Shares, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 934, 947 
(1974) (addressing the impact of valuation on fixed estate taxes).  
 52. See John G. Steinkamp, Common Sense and the Gift Tax Annual 
Exclusion, 72 NEB. L. REV. 106, 116–25 (1993) (providing an overview of the 
exclusion and limitations on that exclusion); Robert B. Smith, Should We Give 
Away the Annual Exclusion?, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 361, 401 (1993) (arguing that 
exclusions make it easy to avoid paying estate taxes); Louis S. Harrison, The 
Strategic Use of Lifetime Gifting Programs to Reduce Estate Taxes in Light of 
Recent Congressional and Internal Revenue Service Antipathy Towards Transfer 
Tax Reduction Devices, 40 DEPAUL L. REV. 365, 375–77 (1991) (looking at 
exclusion gifts as “an effective means to reduce eventual estate taxes”).  
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designed to maximize taxpayers’ use of their federal and state 
exemption amounts53 and the estate tax marital deduction.54 
The trust utilization area of the law blossomed and remained 
vibrant.55 
B. Overview of 2001 Legislative Changes and Current Status of 
the Law 
For years prior to 2001, many commentators and 
politicians called for estate tax repeal.56 They labeled the 
estate tax as the “death tax” and claimed that it was 
summarily destroying small businesses and farms.57 While 
their pleas for repeal gained traction in Congress, primarily 
due to the sympathies of Republican Party members,58 the 
                                                                                                     
 53. See, e.g., Henry M. Ordower, Trusting Our Partners: An Essay on 
Resetting the Estate Planning Defaults for an Adult World, 31 REAL PROP. PROB. 
& TR. J. 313, 347 (1996) (outlining the rationale behind unified credit shelter 
trusts); Larry W. Gibbs, Basic Federal Gift and Estate Taxation, 17 ST. MARY’S 
L.J. 809, 834 (1986) (describing in detail how credit shelter trusts are designed 
to operate). 
 54. See, e.g., Wendy C. Gerzog, The New Supercharged PAT (Power of 
Appointment Trust), 48 HOUS. L. REV. 507, 529–34 (2011) (describing marital 
trust use in the estate planning sphere); Joseph M. Dodge, A Feminist 
Perspective on the QTIP Trust and the Unlimited Marital Deduction, 76 N.C. L. 
REV. 1729, 1729 (1998) (exploring the history of the unlimited estate tax marital 
deduction and how it gave rise to marital deduction trusts). 
 55. See generally Gerzog, supra note 54 (discussing the power of 
appointment trusts in the context of estate planning). 
 56. See Joel C. Dobris, A Brief for the Abolition of All Transfer Taxes, 35 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1215, 1216 (1985) (calling for a repeal of the estate and gift 
tax). 
 57. See id. at 1222 (referring to the estate tax as a death tax); John E. 
Donaldson, The Future of Transfer Taxation: Repeal, Restructuring and 
Refinement, or Replacement, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 539, 545–49 (1993) 
(discussing the unfairness of the estate tax); Charles O. Galvin, To Bury the 
Estate Tax, Not to Praise It, 52 TAX NOTES 1413 (1991) (arguing that the income 
tax should be increased to make up any deficit caused by a repeal of the estate 
tax); Robert B. Smith, Burying the Estate Tax Without Resurrecting Its 
Problems, 55 TAX NOTES 1799 (1992) (calling for the repeal of the estate tax). 
But see Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not to Bury It, 93 YALE L.J. 
257, 274–78 (1983) (discussing the benefits of progressive taxation versus 
regressive taxation). 
 58. See Floyd Norris, The ‘Death Tax’ Lives on Despite Senate Republican 
Efforts to Kill It, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2006, at C3 (discussing the failure of a bill 
that would have repealed the estate tax); Jackie Calmes, Republicans Discover 
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estate tax remained largely intact during the 1980s and 
1990s.59 
But in 2001 everything changed. In a hotly contested 
presidential election, George W. Bush narrowly prevailed over Al 
Gore, and the Republicans commanded a majority in the House 
and a tie in the Senate.60 While the Republicans harbored 
antipathy for the income tax, they expressed even greater disdain 
for the estate tax.61 Within a few months of taking office, with the 
balance of power in Republican hands, the Bush administration 
sought to torpedo the estate tax.62 
Congress accordingly enacted sweeping legislation that 
fundamentally changed the estate tax and set it on a trajectory 
toward obsolescence. Among other things, the Economic Growth 
and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (2001 Act)63 gradually 
raised the estate tax exemption amount, gradually reduced the 
estate tax rate, and suspended the tax in its entirety for a one-
                                                                                                     
Appeal of Killing the ‘Death Tax’: Good Times Make It Politically Acceptable to 
Support Repeal, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 2000, at B2 (looking at the appeal of 
repealing the estate tax to those Americans whose estates would not likely be 
affected by such a tax); President George W. Bush’s Weekly Radio Address, 37 
WKLY. COMPILATION PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 12, at 463–508 (Mar. 17, 2001) 
(“On principle, every family, every farmer and small business person should be 
able to pass on their life’s work to those they love. So we abolish the death tax.”); 
Press Release, Sen. Charles E. Grassley (Mar. 15, 2001), available at LEXIS, 
FEDTAX library, TNT file (“Repealing the federal death tax is critical to the 
financial well-being and survival of family farms and small businesses.”). 
 59. See generally Dobris, supra note 56 (calling for the repeal of the estate 
tax in the 1980s); Donaldson, supra note 57 (calling for the repeal of the estate 
tax in the 1990s). 
 60. See Party Division in the Senate, 1789–Present, U.S. SENATE, 
https://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/one_item_and_teasers/partydiv.htm 
(last visited Jan. 27, 2015) (listing the majority party in Congress) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 61. For a complete compendium of the Republicans’ current arguments 
against the estate tax, see KEVIN BRADY, JOINT ECON. COMM. REPUBLICANS, COST 
AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE FEDERAL ESTATE TAX, AN UPDATE 15–18 (July 25, 
2012), http://www.jec.senate.gov/republicans/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=bc9
424c1-8897-4dbd-b14c-a17c9c5380a3. 
 62. See President George W. Bush’s Weekly Radio Address, 37 WKLY. 
COMPILATION PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 12, at 463–508 (Mar. 17, 2001) 
(discussing reasons for getting rid of the estate tax). 
 63. See Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
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year period in 2010.64 Due to budgetary constraints,65 in 2011 the 
estate tax was scheduled to revert to its original 2001 status;66 
however, the vast majority of politicians suspected that once 
taxpayers were accustomed to the higher estate tax exemption 
amounts (and even a one-year tax suspension), replication of the 
“2001 estate tax world” would be a virtual impossibility.67 The 
2001 Act also repealed the state estate tax credit, replacing it 
with a deduction;68 on a going-forward basis, if states were to levy 
an estate tax, it would come at an additional cost to their 
taxpayers.69  
Late in 2010, with the clock ticking toward reversion to the 
2001 estate tax world, Congress enacted legislation that once 
again sucked vitality from the estate tax.70 With the imprimatur 
of a Democratic president, namely, Barack Obama, Congress 
“temporarily” raised the 2009 estate tax exemption amount over 
40% from $3.5 million to $5 million; raised the gift tax exemption 
amount 500%, from $1 million to $5 million; raised the GST tax 
exemption amount over 40%, from $3.5 million to $5 million; 
indexed these exemption amounts for inflation; and significantly 
lowered the highest estate tax rate from 45% to 35% (its lowest 
                                                                                                     
 64. See id. tit. V (reducing the estate tax and changing the exemption 
amount so that fewer estates are subject to the tax); Sergio Pareja, Estate Tax 
Repeal Under EGTRRA: A Proposal for Simplification, 38 REAL PROP. PROB. & 
TR. J. 73 (2003) (explaining the details of this legislation).  
 65. For an excellent overview of how these constraints operate and how 
politicians seek to circumvent them, see George K. Yin, Temporary Effect 
Legislation, Political Accountability, and Fiscal Restraint, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
174, 228 (2009) (describing how Congress can avoid restraints while still 
appearing to comply with such restraints). 
 66. See Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. 
No. 107-16, § 901, 115 Stat. 38 (sunsetting the legislation after December 31, 
2010). 
 67. See, e.g., William G. Gale & Samara R. Potter, An Economic Evaluation 
of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, 55 NAT’L TAX 
J. 133, 138 (2002), available at http:/ntj.tax.org/ (“Virtually no one believes the 
bill will sunset as written.”). 
 68. See Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, 
§ 531(a)(1)–(3) (replacing the state estate tax credit with a deduction). 
 69. See id. (providing that taxpayers would no longer receive a credit for 
state estate taxes levied against an estate). 
 70. See Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job 
Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, 124 Stat. 3296  (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) (providing relief from the estate tax).  
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rate since 1932).71 Another feature that Congress added to the 
Internal Revenue Code (Code) was portability of the estate tax 
exemption amount between spouses.72 This new feature would 
enable a surviving spouse to capitalize on the decedent spouse’s 
unused estate tax exemption amount without going through the 
tiresome and expensive exercise of establishing so-called bypass 
trusts that, for decades, were instrumental in preserving a 
decedent spouse’s unused exemption amount.73 (Bypass trusts 
had been the darling technique of the estate planning industry, 
often constituting a major justification for expensive estate 
planning fees.)74  
Congress last revisited the estate tax in the waning days of 
2012.75 While Congress had the opportunity to allow the estate 
tax to revert to its historical roots (the estate tax exemption was 
again scheduled to return to $1 million), it chose a different 
path.76 The estate, gift, and GST exemption amounts were 
instead made “permanent” at the $5 million threshold (indexed 
for inflation), and the concept of portability was likewise made 
permanent.77 The only gasping effort that Congress made to keep 
the transfer tax system “alive” was increasing the estate, gift, and 
GST tax rates from 35% to 40% (not counting the two-year 
interval of 2011–2012, still the lowest estate tax rate since 
1932).78  
                                                                                                     
 71. See id. (offering lower rate and exemptions to more estates). 
 72. See id. § 303(a)(4) (offering greater flexibility to a surviving spouse in 
preserving more of the inherited estate). 
 73. See id. (providing a way for a surviving spouse to keep more of the 
inherited estate). 
 74. See Ordower, supra note 53, at 347 (explaining the reasoning for using 
trusts in estate planning); Gibbs, supra note 53, at 834 (describing how trusts 
operate). 
 75. See American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, 126 
Stat. 2313  (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C) (setting the 
maximum estate tax rate at 40%). 
 76. See id. (keeping the higher estate tax exemptions rather than exposing 
more estates to taxation). 
 77. See id. (continuing to allow spouses to capitalize on available 
exemptions). 
 78. See id. § 101(c) (setting the maximum estate tax rate at 40%). 
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With the reduction of rates from 77% in 1941 to 40%, where 
it is today,79 the function of the estate tax has radically changed. 
No longer concerned with breaking up concentrated wealth, it 
now merely adds an element of progression to the income tax 
system—and, indeed, does so rather modestly given its flat 40% 
rate.80  
As the federal government gutted the estate tax, state 
legislatures did not stand idly by.81 Once the federal government 
repealed the credit for state estate taxes, many states 
immediately eliminated their estate taxes entirely.82 Other states 
retained their estate taxes but followed the federal model of 
significantly raising their exemption amounts.83 A few states, 
such as New Jersey,84 retained their estate taxes essentially in 
their 2001 form.85 Nevertheless, only eighteen states still levy an 
estate tax, and pressure continues to mount even within those 
states to eliminate their estate taxes or drastically increase their 
exemption amounts lest their income-tax-paying populaces move 
out of state.86 
On a going-forward basis, absent change, the nation’s federal 
and state estate tax systems will remain anemic.87 On the whole, 
the vast majority of taxpayers have no federal or state estate tax 
                                                                                                     
 79. See id. (describing the maximum estate tax rate). 
 80. See generally THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
(2013) (discussing economic factors and policies driving inequality). 
 81. See Ebeling, supra note 3 (discussing changes to state estate laws). 
 82. See id. (addressing the changes to estate taxes by state legislatures). 
 83. See id. (providing a summary of changing exemption policies in certain 
states). 
 84. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:38-1 to -16 (West 2002) (detailing that the New 
Jersey estate tax uses as an exemption threshold a decedent’s federal estate tax 
liability as if the person died on December 31, 2001).  
 85. See id. (keeping the estate tax law nearly the same as in 2001). 
 86. See Paul Sullivan, Some States Are Moving to Loosen Their Estate 
Taxes, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/25/your-
money/cold-facts-about-estate-taxes.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2015) (looking at 
the motivations for some states to change their estate tax laws to mirror the less 
onerous federal estate tax) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 87. See IRS STATISTICS OF INCOME, ESTATE TAX STATISTICS FILING YEAR 
TABLE 1 (last updated Sept. 12, 2013), http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-
Estate-Tax-Statistics-Filing-Year-Table-1 (last visited Jan. 27, 2015) (revealing 
how little revenue is brought in by the estate tax) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
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exposure.88 Evidence of this proposition abounds. In 2012, for 
example, the number of federal taxable estate tax returns totaled 
3,738, affecting approximately 0.1% of the number of 2012 
decedents.89 Consider, too, that the nation’s transfer tax system 
historically collected approximately 1% to 2% of the nation’s 
overall revenue;90 under the radically transformed transfer tax 
system, this percentage amount will no doubt decline 
precipitously.91  
III. Emerging Trends in the Use of Trust Instruments 
With the federal estate tax emasculated and the majority of 
state legislatures eliminating their estate tax systems,92 estate 
planning bar members must confront significant relevancy 
challenges. No longer can taxpayers be induced to retain 
professional advice on the basis of ominous estate tax clouds 
perched on the horizon. What makes the relevancy challenge 
particularly acute is that taxpayers generally want to ignore their 
own mortality and, moreover, tend to view the future through 
Pollyannaish crystal balls that, in their minds, portend further 
estate tax reductions. The combination of the foregoing leaves 
estate planning bar members in an unenviable situation: they 
possess a great wealth of knowledge in an area of the law 
(namely, estate taxes) that has little or no bearing on the vast 
majority of taxpayers.93 
                                                                                                     
 88. See id. (showing how few estates were subject to an estate tax in 2012). 
 89. See id. (displaying the data compiled by the IRS).  
 90. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES (Dec. 19, 
2009), cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/108xx/doc10841/12-18-estate_ 
gifttax_brief.pdf (“Federal transfer taxes have historically made up a relatively 
small share of total federal revenues—accounting for 1 percent to 2 percent of 
total revenues for the past 60 years.”). 
 91. See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: 
FISCAL YEARS 2012 TO 2022, at 85 (2012), http://www.cbo. 
gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/01-31-2012_Outlook.pdf (estimating 
that the federal estate tax will generate only $14 billion of revenue in 2013—
less than 1% of the nation’s overall revenue). 
 92. See supra Part II.B (providing an overview of 2001 legislative changes 
and the current status of the law). 
 93. See IRS STATISTICS OF INCOME, ESTATE TAX STATISTICS FILING YEAR 
TABLE 1 (updated Sept. 12, 2013), http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Estate-
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Because of the radical transformation of the estate tax laws, 
members of the estate planning bar have been scurrying to 
reinvent themselves, attempting to regain relevancy among the 
members of the general public. In particular, they are 
reexamining trust instruments and transforming the roles that 
such trusts can potentially play in the twenty-first century.  
Below, we document three emerging trends in the area of 
trust law: (A) the employment of trusts to minimize or eliminate 
state income tax burdens,94 (B) the utilization of dynasty trusts to 
preserve wealth within family units,95 and (C) the establishment 
of trusts to protect taxpayers’ wealth from potential creditors.96 
A. Minimizing or Eliminating State Income Tax Burdens 
Since 2001, as the federal estate tax has diminished in 
importance97 and state estate taxes have largely disappeared,98 
state income taxes have generally become more onerous.99 As 
state income taxes have increased in significance,100 estate 
                                                                                                     
Tax-Statistics-Filing-Year-Table-1 (last visited Jan. 27, 2015) (showing that 
very few estates were subject to an estate tax in 2012) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 94. See infra Part III.A (discussing challenges to the residency-by-birth 
method and the establishment of ING trusts). 
 95. See infra Part III.B.3 (discussing the emergence of perpetual dynasty 
trusts). 
 96. See infra Part III.C (discussing the elimination of the self-settled trust 
rule and the effectiveness of the self-settled trust strategy). 
 97. See supra Part II.B (providing an overview of 2001 legislative changes 
and the current status of the law). 
 98. See supra notes 81–86 and accompanying text (discussing state 
reactions to the federal government’s repeal of the credit for state estate taxes). 
 99. See Joseph D. Henchman & Christopher L. Stephens, Playing Fair: 
Distribution, Growth, and Fairness in Federal and State Tax Debates, 51 HARV. 
J. ON LEGIS. 89, 103–06 (2014) (discussing recent measures that states have 
enacted, including several “millionaire taxes,” that were designed to keep their 
budgets solvent); LIZ MALM & GERALD PRANTE, ANNUAL STATE-LOCAL TAX 
BURDEN RANKING FY-2011 (Apr. 2, 2014), http://taxfoundation.org/article/ 
annual-state-local-tax-burden-ranking-fy-2011 (last visited Jan. 27, 2015) 
(“Nationally, average state-local tax burdens . . . on average, rose from 2000 to 
2010, followed by a decrease in 2011.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 100. See, e.g., CAL. REV. & TAX CODE §§ 17041, 17043 (West 2014) (declaring 
that the highest marginal income tax rate in the state of California is currently 
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planners have devised strategies to minimize their impact. 
Achieving such tax savings, however, requires technical expertise 
and circumspection. In this subpart, we explore how estate 
planners establish trust situs in low-tax jurisdictions. 
But before exploring those techniques that estate planners 
recommend to establish trust situs in low-tax jurisdictions, a 
framework is necessary. States generally treat trusts as if they 
were individual taxpayers and, accordingly, classify trusts as 
either resident or nonresident in nature.101 For those trusts that 
are identified as being resident, taxpayers are generally taxed on 
all of their income; in contrast, for those trusts that are identified 
as being nonresident, taxpayers are generally taxed only on 
income that is sourced within the state seeking to impose tax.102 
The rules that define trust residency vary from state to 
state.103 For example, some states claim that a trust is a resident 
if at least one trustee is a resident of the state;104 other states 
claim that a trust is a resident based on where the majority of 
fiduciary decisions are made.105 Historically, however, the most 
common method for determining trust residency has been based 
upon the residency of the individual taxpayer who established the 
trust during life or upon death (known as the residency-by-birth 
method).106  
                                                                                                     
13.3%). 
 101. See source cited infra note 102 (examining the statutory approaches to 
both resident and nonresident trusts). 
 102. See generally Warren R. Calvert & Sylvia Z. Gaspar, State Taxation of 
Accumulated Trust Income: Statutory Approaches and Constitutional 
Considerations, 5 ST. & LOC. TAX LAW 73, 76 (2000) (examining statutory 
approaches to the income taxation of accumulated trust income and discussing 
the constitutional considerations that govern the validity of more common 
schemes). 
 103. See infra notes 104–107 and accompanying text (detailing various state 
approaches to determining trust residency). 
 104. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-1301(5) (West 2011) (“If a trust has 
more than one fiduciary, the trust is a resident trust if at least one of the 
fiduciaries is a resident of this state.”).  
 105. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 316.282(1)(d) (2013) (“In the case of a 
fiduciary that is a corporate fiduciary engaged in interstate trust 
administration, the residence and place of administration of a trust both refer to 
the place where the majority of fiduciary decisions are made in administering 
the trust.”). 
 106. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-701(4) (2012) (“‘Resident trust or estate’ 
means (A) the estate of a decedent who at the time of his death was a resident of 
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Most states declare that any trust not identified as a resident 
trust is, by default, classified as a nonresident trust.107 
1. Challenges to the Residency-by-Birth Method 
Over the last several decades, the residency-by-birth method 
has been the target of numerous constitutional challenges.108 This 
is because, once established, the trust in question may have little 
or no subsequent nexus with the state actually claiming 
jurisdiction.109  
In Quill Corp. v. North Dakota,110 the U.S. Supreme Court 
indirectly issued guidance in this area of the law. In Quill, via 
mail order, a taxpayer made sales to North Dakota residents, and 
the state sought to collect use tax from the taxpayer.111 The 
question before the court was as follows: Under the Constitution’s 
Commerce and Due Process Clauses, did North Dakota have a 
right to force the taxpayer, who had no physical presence in the 
state, to collect use tax?112 Regarding the Commerce Clause issue, 
the court ruled that requiring the taxpayer to collect use tax in 
North Dakota and throughout the country would unduly burden 
interstate commerce and, as such, was impermissible.113 On the 
due process clause issue, however, the court ruled that only 
“minimum contacts” were necessary to justify jurisdiction; and 
because the taxpayer had a targeted marketing campaign of 
mailing advertising catalogs to North Dakota residents, the 
threshold had been met.114 
                                                                                                     
this state . . . .”). 
 107. See, e.g., N.Y. TAX LAW § 605(b)(4) (McKinney 2009) (“A nonresident 
trust means a trust which is not a resident or part-year resident.”). 
 108. See infra notes 110–127 and accompanying text (discussing several of 
these constitutional challenges). 
 109. See infra notes 116–120 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of 
nexus with the state as grounds for a constitutional challenge to the state 
treating a trust as resident for taxation purposes). 
 110. 504 U.S. 298 (1992). 
 111. Id. at 302–03. 
 112. See id. at 304 (outlining the procedural posture of the case). 
 113. Id. at 309–17. 
 114. Id. at 306–08. 
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In Quill’s aftermath, some state courts have continued to 
uphold residency-by-birth statutes.115 Consider the facts of Chase 
Manhattan Bank v. Gavin.116 A Connecticut resident established 
two trusts, one inter vivos and the other testamentary in 
nature.117 The question before the Connecticut Supreme Court 
was whether it was constitutional for Connecticut to treat each as 
being a resident trust despite the fact that neither trust had any 
continuing nexus with Connecticut (i.e., all trust beneficiaries, 
trustees, and investments were located out of state).118  
Insofar as the testamentary trust was concerned, the 
Connecticut Supreme Court held in favor of the state.119 More 
specifically, it ruled that there was no due process violation 
because the Connecticut probate court had continuing jurisdiction 
over the trust to settle its accounts and the like, and therefore the 
“minimum contact” threshold that Quill had established had been 
met.120 Likewise, there was no violation of the Commerce Clause 
because Connecticut’s tax imposition would not likely dissuade a 
taxpayer from selecting out-of-state trustees based upon the fear 
that another state’s income tax might be imposed.121 
Insofar as taxation of the inter vivos trust was concerned, the 
Connecticut Supreme Court ruled that this, too, was 
constitutionally permissible.122 While acknowledging that 
resolution of this issue was a closer constitutional call, the court 
claimed that there was a “critical link” between the trust and 
Connecticut because the trust’s primary beneficiary was a 
Connecticut resident.123  
Even in the aftermath of the Quill decision, the 
constitutionality of state taxing statutes that are entirely based 
                                                                                                     
 115. See infra notes 116–123 and accompanying text (outlining a 
Connecticut case that upheld a residency-by-birth statute). 
 116. 733 A.2d 782 (Conn. 1999). 
 117. Id. at 786.  
 118. See id. at 785–86 (listing the issues before the court). 
 119. See id. at 786 (affirming the trial court’s judgment in favor of the state). 
 120. Id. at 791–93. 
 121. Id. at 804–07. 
 122. Id. at 801–03. 
 123. Id. at 801 (“There must be some ‘definite link, some minimum 
connection between’ the state and the income that it seeks to tax.”). 
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on the residency-by-birth method remains suspect.124 Indeed, 
several state courts have struck down such statutes.125 Many 
state legislatures have therefore undertaken initiatives to ensure 
the constitutionality—and clarity—of their resident trust 
statutes.126 Under the laws of many states, a so-called resident 
trust not only must be established by a resident of that particular 
state but also there must be some other nexus with the state—
that is, the trustee, the beneficiary, or trust property must be 
located in the state.127 
2. Establishment of ING Trusts 
With the basic framework for the state income taxation of 
trusts in mind, estate planning attorneys have been creating 
strategies designed to minimize their clients’ state income tax 
burdens.128 A few of the techniques that they recommend are 
fairly basic;129 others are more aggressive. One popular technique 
                                                                                                     
 124. See infra note 125 and accompanying text (detailing multiple states 
that struck down residency-by-birth statutes). 
 125. See, e.g., Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Murphy, 203 N.E.2d 
490 (N.Y. 1964) (addressing an inter vivos trust); In re Swift, 727 S.W.2d 880 
(Mo. 1987) (addressing testamentary trusts); Westfall v. Dir. of Revenue, 812 
S.W.2d 513 (Mo. 1991) (addressing a testamentary trust); Blue v. Dep’t of 
Treasury, 462 N.W.2d 762 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (addressing a resident trust); 
Pennoyer v. Taxation Dir., 5 N.J. Tax 386 (N.J. Tax Ct. 1983) (addressing a 
testamentary trust); Potter v. Taxation Div. Dir., 5 N.J. Tax 399 (N.J. Tax Ct. 
1983) (addressing an inter vivos trust). 
 126. See infra note 127 and accompanying text (discussing the laws of many 
states that require a resident trust to have a nexus with the state, i.e., be 
located in the state). 
 127. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 143.331 (2014) (declaring that a trust will be 
deemed a Missouri resident only if it is created by a Missouri resident and at 
least one income beneficiary is a Missouri resident). 
 128. See infra note 129 and accompanying text (discussing some basic 
techniques employed by attorneys for minimizing their clients’ state income 
tax). 
 129. Some of the basic techniques require action items prior to trust 
establishment. For example, one easy way to avoid state income taxation on a 
trust is for the trust settlor to move from a high-tax jurisdiction, such as 
California, to a low-tax jurisdiction, such as Florida (which does not levy a state 
income tax), and then establish a trust. Prudent trustee selection is also critical 
(i.e., avoiding the selection of a trustee domiciled in a state that predicates 
taxation based upon a trustee’s residency). See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-
1301(5) (West 2011) (providing trust situs dependent upon residency of trustee). 
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involves locating so-called incomplete nongrantor (ING) trusts in 
a state (e.g., Delaware) that does not impose an income tax. The 
goal of establishing an ING trust is straightforward: the 
elimination of state income tax on the investment income 
generated by the assets conveyed to the trust. Actually achieving 
this goal, however, requires technical sophistication. 
When establishing an ING trust, estate planning attorneys’ 
objectives are generally twofold. First and foremost, they want to 
ensure that the trust in question is treated as a nonresident trust 
in the client’s home state.130 They therefore take important 
                                                                                                     
Another strategy that estate planning attorneys routinely recommend to those 
clients who are considering establishing trusts and who have children who are 
domiciled in different states is that instead of establishing one trust for the 
benefit of all of their children (which might subject the entirety of the trust’s 
income to taxation in those states that predicate taxation based upon the 
residency of the trust beneficiaries, see, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54A:1-2 (West 
2004) (declaring that trust situs is dependent upon the residency of the 
beneficiaries)), they should establish a separate trust for the benefit of each 
child to capture the benefits of those states that impose little or no income tax. A 
final technique that may avoid state income taxation is to make the terms of the 
trust entirely discretionary in nature; the absence of any trust beneficiary with 
a vested interest can negate taxation in those states that utilize beneficiaries’ 
domicile as a metric to determine trust residency. See McNeil v. Commonwealth, 
67 A.3d 185, 198 (Pa. 2013) (holding a residency-by-birth statute 
unconstitutional when applied to a discretionary inter vivos trust with residency 
beneficiaries but no trustees, assets, or income located in Pennsylvania). See 
generally Joseph W. Blackburn, Constitutional Limits on State Taxation of a 
Nonresident Trustee: Gavin Misinterprets and Misapplies Both Quill and 
McCulloch, 76 MISS. L.J. 1, 25–27 (2006) (discussing techniques to avoid state 
income taxation of trust beneficiaries). 
Even after the trust is established, estate planners may utilize other 
planning strategies to circumnavigate the imposition of state income taxes. For 
example, if trust situs is based upon the trustee’s state of residency (which is 
located in a state that imposes a high state income tax), the trust beneficiaries 
can request that the trustee resign. If, instead, trust situs is based upon the 
location of trust property, see, e.g., Westfall v. Dir. of Revenue, 812 S.W.2d 513, 
517 (Mo. 1991) (holding that owning a small parcel of Missouri real property 
was a sufficient basis upon which the state could justify its taxation of trust 
income), then the trustee should consider moving such property; if this is not 
possible because it engenders title to real property, a solution would be selling 
such property and reinvesting the proceeds in property located outside of that 
particular taxing jurisdiction. 
 130. See, e.g., N.Y. TAX LAW § 605(b)(3)(B) (McKinney 2014) (describing 
nonresident trusts). Note, however, that New York has enacted legislation that 
would limit the advantages of using an out-of-state trust. Under the legislation, 
when distributions are made by the trust to New York beneficiaries, they are 
taxable under a so-called “throwback rule.” N.Y. TAX LAW § 612(b)(40). 
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precautions with respect to such trusts. These precautionary 
steps include installing out-of-state trustees, mandating that 
trust property be located outside the client’s home jurisdiction, 
and requiring that the trust itself have no vested beneficiaries. 
Second, estate planners craft the trust terms to ensure that 
trust contributions do not result in a completed gift and that, for 
income tax purposes, the trust is treated as a nongrantor trust.131 
It is important to avoid making a completed gift so that a gift tax 
liability is not imposed in connection with the trust’s creation.132 
It is likewise important to avoid grantor-trust status because, in 
the case of a grantor trust, all of its income is taxed to the grantor 
for state, as well as federal, income tax purposes.133 Thus, with a 
grantor trust, all of the trust’s income would be taxed to the 
grantor in his or her home state, defeating the purpose of the 
strategy.134 To fulfill these objectives, ING trusts often have 
several special attributes.  
In multiple private letter rulings, the IRS initially ruled that 
trust contributions to such trusts were incomplete and that the 
trust terms did not cause them to be grantor trusts.135 These 
private letter rulings essentially sanctioned the use of these 
trusts as gift-tax-free devices that enable taxpayers to avoid 
income in their home state on the assets conveyed to the trust.136 
But several years after issuing the aforementioned favorable 
taxpayer private letter rulings, the IRS began to question its own 
                                                                                                     
 131. See id. § 612(b)(41) (describing incomplete gift nongrantor trusts). 
 132. See I.R.C. § 2501(a) (2012) (“A tax . . . is hereby imposed for each 
calendar year on the transfer of property by gift during such calendar year by 
any individual resident or nonresident.”). 
 133. See id. § 671 (describing grantor trusts and tax liability). 
 134. See id. (describing the tax liability). 
 135. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2001-48-028 (Nov. 30, 2001) (ruling that trust 
contributions to ING trusts were incomplete and that the trust terms did not 
cause them to be grantor trusts); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-47-013 (Nov. 22, 
2002) (same); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2005-02-014 (Jan. 14, 2005) (same); I.R.S. 
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2006-12-002 (Mar. 24, 2006) (same); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2006-
37-025 (Sept. 15, 2006) (same); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2006-47-001 (Nov. 24, 2006) 
(same); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2007-15-005 (Apr. 13, 2007) (same); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. 
Rul. 2007-29-025 (July 20, 2007) (same); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2007-31-019 (May 
1, 2007) (same). 
 136. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2001-48-028 (Nov. 30, 2001) (determining that 
ING trusts were incomplete and that the terms did not cause them to be grantor 
trusts). 
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analysis in these rulings.137 More recently, in response to a 
somewhat different drafting approach, the IRS has again 
endorsed the strategy, ruling that the trust terms in question 
would neither trigger a taxable gift nor be categorized as a 
grantor trust.138  
Evident by the amount of time, energy, and resources that 
estate planning attorneys have devoted to ING trust 
development, there is little doubt that they must achieve 
significant tax savings.139 Over the last decade and half, the 
estate planning bar has reconceived the role of the trust from 
that of an estate tax savior to that of an income tax savior.140 By 
redesigning the role of trust instruments, the estate planning bar 
has been able to resurrect its relevancy.  
B. Preserving Wealth Within Family Bloodlines 
The trust evolution did not stop with income tax 
minimization or elimination. In seeking to develop methods of 
trust utilization to appeal to its expanding client base, the estate 
planning bar designed dynasty trusts to preserve wealth within 
family bloodlines.141  
                                                                                                     
 137. See Press Release, Internal Revenue Serv., Chief Counsel Seeking 
Comment on Gift Tax Consequences of Trusts Employing Distribution 
Committee (July 9, 2007) (No. 2007-127) (questioning its own prior sanctions of 
the use of ING trusts as gift-tax-free devices). 
 138. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2013-10-002 (Nov. 12, 2013) (showing that the 
taxpayer established an irrevocable trust). With the taxpayer’s consent, 
principal and income distributions could be made to the taxpayer or issue (but 
only with the approval of a distribution committee comprised of the taxpayer 
and the taxpayer’s sons); without the taxpayer’s consent, principal and income 
distributions could be made to the taxpayer or issue (but only with the 
unanimous approval of the distribution committee members, excluding the 
taxpayer); in a nonfiduciary capacity, the taxpayer could make principal 
distributions among the grantor’s issue for their health, education, 
maintenance, and support; and the taxpayer retained a limited testamentary 
power of appointment. Id. 
 139. See Richard W. Nenno, Planning to Minimize or Avoid State Income 
Taxation on Trusts, 34 ACTEC J. 131, 146 (2008) (presenting an excellent 
summary of how properly established trusts in the “right jurisdictions” can yield 
tremendous state income tax savings). 
 140. See id. (summarizing how properly established trusts can yield 
tremendous state income tax savings). 
 141. See infra Part III.B.3 (discussing the emergence of perpetual dynasty 
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1. The Rule Against Perpetuities and the GST Tax 
For centuries, what is known as the rule against perpetuities 
placed timing limits on the vesting of property interests.142 In 
essence, the rule required that vesting had to occur within 
twenty-one years of a life (or lives) in being.143 Its purpose was to 
prevent the negative economic and interpersonal consequences 
that would ensue were the property subject to restrictions of a 
problematic duration.144  
Application of the rule against perpetuities often meant that 
trust property would vest at least once every one hundred years 
or so. Consider the following fact pattern: Assume that under the 
terms of a decedent’s will, the decedent established a trust for the 
lifetime benefit of his descendants. Assume further that, at the 
time of the decedent’s death, the youngest of his descendants was 
his one-year-old grandchild. Properly drafted, the trust would 
terminate twenty-one years after the death of this grandchild, 
which, assuming the grandchild died at the age of eighty, would 
enable the trust to remain intact for 101 years.  
Aside from the rule against perpetuities, the GST tax was 
designed to eliminate the estate tax advantages offered by long-
term trusts, which defer estate tax imposition.145 The GST tax is 
a tax that applies in addition to federal gift and estate taxes.146 
                                                                                                     
trusts). 
 142. See infra note 143 and accompanying text (discussing the function of 
the rule against perpetuities (RAP)). 
 143. See Stewart E. Sterk, Jurisdictional Competition to Abolish the Rule 
Against Perpetuities: R.I.P. for the R.A.P., 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2097, 2098–99 
(2003) [hereinafter Sterk, Judicial Interpretation] (discussing reaction to the 
abolishment of the RAP) (quoting JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, RULE AGAINST 
PERPETUITIES 191 (4th ed. 1942) (“No interest is good unless it must vest, if at 
all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the 
interest.”)). 
 144. See Heather M. Marshall, Instead of Asking “When,” Ask “How”: Why 
the Rule Against Perpetuities Should Not Apply to Rights of First Refusal, 44 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 763, 766 (2010) (providing background information regarding 
prohibitions against restraints on property rights and the right of first refusal); 
Lewis M. Simes, The Policy Against Perpetuities, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 707, 708–12 
(1955) (discussing the public policy reasons behind the RAP).  
 145. It seems logical, therefore, to expect the enactment of the GST tax to 
diminish interest in creating such long-term trusts. Ironically, just the opposite 
has occurred. 
 146. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (noting that the GST was a 
282 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 257 (2015) 
As noted earlier, the Code triggers its application when property 
passes to or for the benefit of so-called skip persons, i.e., 
generally, people two or more generations removed from the 
transferor, such as a grandchild or a great-grandchild.147 
Designed to act as a surrogate for the estate tax that would 
otherwise be imposed on the children’s generation, the GST tax 
seeks to prevent taxpayers from circumventing the principle that 
the estate tax should be imposed once per generation and thereby 
safeguards the integrity of the estate tax.148 The GST tax rate has 
always been flat, equal to the highest marginal federal estate tax 
rate.149  
To illustrate GST tax application, consider a case where the 
decedent establishes a testamentary trust for the benefit of his 
children, after which the trust corpus passes in further trust for 
the benefit of his grandchildren and great-grandchildren. At the 
death of the decedent’s last surviving child, the trust experiences 
what the Code identifies as a taxable termination and, as such, 
would be subject to GST tax.150 However, if the decedent had 
allocated his entire GST tax exemption of $5.34 million (the 
current exemption amount) to the trust and if the value of the 
assets transferred to the trust did not exceed this amount, the 
trust would remain permanently free of GST tax. Thus, even if 
the trust were to remain intact for, say, five hundred years, no 
                                                                                                     
complement to the federal estate tax). 
 147. See I.R.C. § 2613(a) (2012) (“For purposes of this chapter, the term ‘skip 
person’ means . . . a natural person assigned to a generation which is 2 or more 
generations below the generation assignment of the transferor . . . .”). 
 148. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (noting that the GST was a 
complement to the federal estate tax designed to protect its integrity); Estate of 
Gerson v. Comm’r, 127 T.C. 139, 142–43 (2006) (“The public policy underlying 
the GST tax is to bring uniformity and consistency to Federal transfer taxes 
(estate, gift, and generation-skipping) by imposing a transfer tax upon all 
transfers whether directly to an immediate succeeding generation or to 
generations further removed from the transferor.”), aff’d, 507 F.3d 435 (6th Cir. 
2007).  
 149. See I.R.C. § 2641(a)(1) (“For purposes of this chapter, the term 
‘applicable rate’ means, with respect to any generation-skipping transfer, the 
product of . . . the maximum Federal estate tax rate, and . . . the inclusion ratio 
with respect to the transfer.”). 
 150. See id. § 2612(a) (“For purposes of this chapter, the term ‘taxable 
termination’ means the termination (by death, lapse of time, release of power, or 
otherwise) of an interest in property held in a trust . . . .”). 
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GST tax would ever be imposed. And, if properly drafted, the 
trust’s assets would likewise not be subject to tax in the estates of 
any of the descendants. The longer the trust remained in 
existence, the greater the tax savings the exemption would 
produce.  
2.  The Downfall of the Rule Against Perpetuities and the GST 
Tax 
To optimize the tax savings, therefore, it was necessary to 
locate such GST-exempt trusts in jurisdictions permitting 
perpetual trusts. Thus began the search for jurisdictions willing 
to eliminate the rule against perpetuities. The estate planning 
bar found state legislatures extraordinarily receptive.151 Why did 
a rule that appeared so deeply engrained in the law’s fabric 
become unwoven so quickly? With the promise that rule against 
perpetuities elimination would attract massive amounts of capital 
investment, state legislatures readily jumped on the repeal 
bandwagon.152 Once one state repealed its rule against 
perpetuities, other states, fearful of losing capital investments, 
quickly followed suit.153 Today, the vast majority of states have 
either repealed or greatly curtailed their rule against 
perpetuities.154  
                                                                                                     
 151. See infra notes 152–154 and accompanying text (discussing the 
overwhelming cooperation by states in eliminating the RAP from estate 
planning). 
 152. See Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Perpetuities or Taxes? 
Explaining the Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2465, 2474 
(2006) (discussing the multiple states that followed Delaware in its repeal of the 
RAP as applied to interests in trusts); Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. 
Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds: An Empirical 
Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356, 404 (2005) (“Within the 
timeframe of our sample, 17 states abolished the RAP with a resulting average 
increase of $6 billion in trust assets per state.”). 
 153. See supra note 152 and accompanying text (noting the domino effect 
among states to repeal the RAP as applied to interests in trusts). 
 154. See, e.g., Robert H. Sitkoff, Trusts and Estates: Implementing Freedom 
of Disposition, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 643, 668 (2014) (“Most strikingly, as a 
consequence of the competition across the states for trust business, more than 
half the states have abrogated the Rule to allow for a perpetual trust.” (emphasis 
added)). 
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For two reasons, the GST tax has likewise lost its vibrancy. 
First, like the federal estate tax applicable exclusion amount,155 
the GST exemption amount has increased vastly in size from $1.5 
million (in 2005) to $5.34 million (in 2014)156 and is annually 
adjusted upward for inflation.157 This bountiful GST exemption 
amount enables married couples to transfer massive amounts of 
wealth into trusts that are entirely insulated from any transfer 
tax for generations to come. Second, federal estate tax rates have 
changed from graduated to flat.158 Historically, federal estate tax 
rates have been steeply graduated and the GST tax rate has 
always equaled the highest federal estate tax percentage,159 
routinely dissuading long-term trust creation. Now, however, 
because the federal estate tax rate is flat (currently set at 40%),160 
GST tax imposition often inflicts no greater financial burden than 
had the federal estate tax itself been imposed. 
3. The Rise of Dynasty Trusts 
With the rule against perpetuities eliminated in many states 
and the application and impact of the GST tax neutered, the 
estate planning bar has begun to tout so-called dynasty trusts.161 
                                                                                                     
 155. See I.R.C. § 2010(c)(2) (2012) (declaring that the applicable exclusion 
amount is at least $5 million). 
 156. See id. § 2631(c) (explaining that the GST exemption amount “shall be 
equal to the basic exclusion amount” used to calculate the federal estate tax 
applicable exclusion amount). 
 157. See Rev. Proc. 2013-15, § 2.13 (confirming that the basic exclusion 
amount against estate tax for an estate of any decedent dying during calendar 
year 2013 is $5.25 million, proving that it continues to be indexed for inflation). 
 158. See infra note 160 and accompanying text (noting that the federal 
estate tax rate is now flat and currently set at 40%). 
 159. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (noting that the GST tax has 
a flat rate equal to the highest federal estate tax rate). 
 160. See I.R.C. § 2001(c) (detailing the rate schedule for the federal estate 
tax). 
 161. See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND 
ESTATES 897 (2013) (reproducing an advertisement from a South Dakota trust 
company, highlighting the fact that South Dakota has repealed its rule against 
perpetuities). See generally Joshua C. Tate, Perpetual Trusts and the Settlor’s 
Intent, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 595, 602–26 (2005) (examining perpetual dynasty 
trusts through the lens of settlor intent); Joel C. Dobris, The Death of the Rule 
Against Perpetuities, or the RAP Has No Friends—An Essay, 35 REAL PROP. 
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The terms of these trusts are unprecedented in the field of trust 
law: they are designed to last generations to come and, depending 
upon GST exemption allocation, will escape transfer tax 
application over this same period of time.162 Aside from the 
transfer tax benefits that such trusts offer, the estate planning 
bar flaunts the fact that the establishment of such trusts can 
serve as a viable mechanism to essentially immortalize the 
settlor.163  
Because of the elongated time period that such trusts are 
supposed to remain in existence, the estate planning bar has 
engrafted such trusts with an immense amount of flexibility.164 
Common trust provisions include lifetime and testamentary 
special powers of appointment bestowed on trust beneficiaries, 
the ability of the trustee to change trust situs, and designation of 
trust protectorates to ensure ample investment oversight.165 
Made out of whole cloth, dynasty trusts constitute an innovative 
new offering unique to a world in which trusts have always been 
of limited duration. 
C. Protecting Assets from Creditors 
In general, creditors of a trust beneficiary cannot reach trust 
assets when the instrument or a statutory default rule confers 
spendthrift protection on the trust.166 However, under an 
important exception—known as the “self-settled trust rule”167—
                                                                                                     
PROB. & TR. J. 601, 614–21 (2000) (analyzing the RAP’s decline as society’s 
attitudes toward aggregations of wealth in perpetual trusts have grown more 
favorable); Note, Dynasty Trusts and the Rule Against Perpetuities, 116 HARV. L. 
REV. 2588, 2595–609 (2003) (offering a framework for assessing both the impact 
and the desirability of getting rid of the RAP, and discussing dynasty trusts). 
 162. See supra note 161 (discussing the attributes of perpetual dynasty 
trusts). 
 163. See supra note 161. 
 164. See supra note 161. 
 165. See supra note 161. 
 166. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 58 (2003) (setting forth the 
spendthrift concept). 
 167. See Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law’s Race to the 
Bottom?, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1035, 1043 (2000) [hereinafter Sterk, Asset 
Protection Trusts] (discussing the self-settled trust rule). 
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the settlor’s creditors are permitted to reach trust assets to the 
extent of the settlor’s interest in the trust.168  
Common law,169 as well as statutory law in some states,170 
sets forth the parameters of the self-settled trust rule. This rule 
essentially provides that if the terms of a trust give the trustee 
discretion to distribute the entire trust to the settlor, the settlor’s 
creditor could reach all of the trust’s assets even if the trustee 
were unwilling to exercise discretion in favor of the settlor or the 
creditors; on the other hand, if the trust terms permit only the 
trust’s income to be distributed to the settlor, a creditor could 
only reach the trust’s income and not its principal.171 Not only 
does the self-settled rule pose creditor-protection issues, it is also 
problematic from another perspective: under the federal estate 
tax, because creditors have direct access to the assets of self-
settled trusts, such access causes the trust’s assets to be treated 
for estate tax purposes as if owned by the settlor, resulting in 
estate tax inclusion of all of the posttransfer appreciation.172  
1. Elimination of the Self-Settled Trust Rule 
In the 1990s, the estate planning bar recognized that if the 
self-settled trust rule were eliminated, self-settled trusts could 
                                                                                                     
 168. See, e.g., GRISWOLD, supra note 9, § 282.1 (“It is almost universally held 
that a person cannot create an effective spendthrift trust for his own 
benefit . . . .”). 
 169. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156 (1959) (denying creditor 
protection in the case of a self-settled trust); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS 
§ 60 cmt. f (2003) (same). 
 170. See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-3.1 (2005) (codifying the 
common law approach).  
 171. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 60 cmt. f (2003) (indicating that 
the creditors could reach the maximum amount that could be distributed to the 
settlor). 
 172. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(b)(2) (requiring inclusion in the gross estate 
where assets transferred in trust could be used as a matter of state law to 
discharge the settlor’s legal obligation); Rev. Rul. 76-103, 1976-1 C.B. 293 
(finding a gift incomplete for tax purposes based on the ability of the settlor’s 
creditors under state law to reach the assets of a self-settled trust); Estate of 
Paxton v. Comm’r, 86 T.C. 785 (1986) (applying I.R.C. § 2036 to include assets in 
a self-settled trust in the settlor’s gross estate based on the self-settled trust 
rule under applicable state law). 
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possibly provide two valuable strategic advantages.173 First, a 
settlor concerned about the possibility of future creditors could 
establish a self-settled trust without having to surrender 
permanent and unequivocal access to the assets, which is 
ordinarily the case when an outright gift is used for creditor-
protection purposes.174 Second, a self-settled trust could offer an 
ability to minimize estate tax liability while still allowing the 
settlor to retain indirect control of his or her assets.  
In light of these strategic advantages, starting in Alaska, the 
estate planning bar—along with other professionals, particularly 
from the banking industry—mobilized and successfully lobbied 
for legislation that would overrule the self-settled trust rule.175 By 
designating an Alaskan trustee, making the trust irrevocable, 
inserting a spendthrift provision, and invoking choice-of-law 
provision making Alaskan law controlling in the trust 
instrument, nonresidents could seek to avoid the self-settled trust 
rule in their home state.176 Thus, for example, a person residing 
                                                                                                     
 173. See, e.g., Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts, supra note 167, at 1035–40 
(discussing the earlier use of such trusts in an offshore context and their later 
evolution in the domestic context). 
 174. All outright gifts as well as gifts in trust can be set aside by creditors if 
the gift constitutes a fraudulent conveyance or transfer. See Uniform 
Fraudulent Transfer Act, 7A pt. 2 U.L.A. 4, prefatory n. (2006) (setting out this 
rule). Thus, if the gift or transfer in trust is made at a time when claims have 
already been asserted, the creditor may well be able to collect from the 
transferee. Yet, if no claim is pending or foreseeable at the time of the 
gift/transfer, it is unclear whether such a transfer constitutes a fraudulent 
conveyance. The applicability of these statutes is unclear. Courts have 
nonetheless found transfers/gifts invalid when made to hinder or delay a future 
creditor. See, e.g., United States v. Chapman, 756 F.2d 1237, 1241 (5th Cir. 
1985) (indicating that where a gift/transfer is made with the intent to “shield 
the property from debts thereafter to be incurred,” it can be set aside as 
fraudulent); Charles D. Fox IV & Michael J. Huft, Asset Protection and Dynasty 
Trusts, 37 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 287, 303–06 (2002) (discussing fraudulent 
conveyance claims); Robert T. Danforth, Rethinking the Law of Creditors’ Rights 
in Trusts, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 287, 312 (2002) (discussing fraudulent conveyance 
claims under Alaska law).  
 175. See Amy Lynn Wagenfeld, Law for Sale: Alaska and Delaware Compete 
for the Asset Protection Trust Market and the Wealth That Follows, 32 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 831, 850 (1999) (indicating that Alaska was the first state to 
enact such legislation and that Delaware did so shortly thereafter); Danforth, 
supra note 174, at 312–18 (recounting the history of state action overruling the 
self-settled trust rule).  
 176. See Wagenfeld, supra note 175, at 852–55 (outlining Alaska’s choice-of-
law provision). 
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in a common law state who wanted to establish a self-settled 
trust that provided creditor protection could create the trust with 
spendthrift protection in Alaska. Under the Alaskan 
legislation,177 as well as conventional conflicts-of-law analysis,178 
there would be sufficient contacts with the state of Alaska to 
make application of its law appropriate. As noted, this would 
permit the settlor to retain access to the assets conveyed to the 
trust while hopefully creating a shield that would provide not 
only creditor protection but also negate estate tax inclusion issues 
(i.e., because the settlor’s creditors would have no access to the 
trust’s assets, for estate tax purposes there would be no state law 
predicate for treating the settlor as the de facto trust asset 
owner).179  
 Other states quickly began to follow suit, unleashing a race 
among the states to create trust legislation that would be 
effective in attracting nonresidents.180 Even today, this race 
                                                                                                     
 177. See ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.035(c) (2008) (providing that such a choice-of-
law provision is conclusive if, among other requirements, some part of the 
trust’s assets is deposited in Alaska and part or all of the administration occurs 
in Alaska); Danforth, supra note 174, at 312 (discussing the requirements of the 
Alaska statute for securing creditor protection under its legislation); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 12, § 3570 (2005) (requiring a Delaware trustee and a designation in 
the instrument that Delaware law is controlling). 
 178. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 270 (1971) 
(indicating that a choice-of-law provision in a trust instrument is to be respected 
in terms of the trust’s validity if there is a substantial relation to the state), with 
Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 494–95 (2003) (indicating that a state 
can constitutionally apply its laws only if there are sufficient contacts with the 
state). 
 179. Compare I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2009-44-002 (July 15, 2009) (concluding 
that the assets of a self-settled trust settled by an Alaskan in Alaska would not 
generally be included in the settlor’s gross estate unless there was an 
understanding, express or implied, under which the settlor would be entitled to 
receive distributions), and Rev. Rul. 2004-64, 2004-2 C.B. 7 (July 6, 2004) 
(indicating that express or implied understanding is sufficient to trigger 
inclusion under I.R.C. § 2036), with I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-37-007 (June 10, 
1998) (refusing to address the inclusion issued under I.R.C. § 2026 in the 
context of a self-settled trust located in a state that had overruled the common 
law self-settled trust rule after first concluding that the gift to the trust was 
complete for gift tax purposes).  
 180. See David M. English, The Impact of Uniform Laws on the Teaching of 
Trusts and Estates, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 689, 693 (2014) (“But beginning with 
Alaska in 1997, fourteen U.S. states have enacted what are known as Domestic 
Asset Protection Trust (DAPT) statutes.”); John K. Eason, Policy, Logic and 
Persuasion in the Evolving Realm of Trust Asset Protection, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 
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shows no signs of abating as more and more states rush to join 
the self-settled asset protection trust bandwagon.181 
2. Effectiveness of the Self-Settled Trust Strategy 
Notwithstanding the fact that many self-settled asset 
protection trusts have been established in the states that have 
eliminated the self-settled rule,182 salient questions remain about 
the effectiveness of the self-settled trust strategy. First, it is not 
clear that a settlor who resides in a common law state can, 
through the simple expedient of including a choice-of-law 
provision in the trust instrument, sidestep the home-state 
common law approach.183 If the choice-of-law provision is found to 
violate the home state’s strong public policy, courts will generally 
refuse to enforce it.184 Second, in 2005, Congress amended the 
Bankruptcy Code to create a federalized self-settled trust rule:185 
                                                                                                     
2621, 2622–24 (2006) (reviewing the history of asset protection legislation and 
indicating that many other states began to follow the lead of Alaska and 
Delaware). 
 181. See Adam S. Hofri-Winogradow, The Stripping of the Trust: From 
Evolutionary Scripts to Distributive Results, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 529, 542–43 (2014) 
(describing the rapid spread of state legislation sanctioning the use of asset 
protection trusts). 
 182. See Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 152, at 380–85 (documenting 
the migration of trusts to states that have enacted settlor-friendly legislation). 
 183. See id. at 412–14 (highlighting that there is not much information 
about the effects of statutory changes on the common law rules). 
 184. See Rush Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Sessions, 980 N.E.2d 45, 58 (Ill. 2012) 
(refusing to respect such a choice-of-law provision); In re Huber, 493 B.R. 798, 
807–09 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2013) (disregarding Alaska law—where the trust 
had been established—and applying Washington law to find that the transfers 
to the trust were void as to creditors because Washington had the most 
significant relationship with the trust and Washington has a strong public 
policy against self-settled trusts); In re Portnoy, 201 B.R. 685, 696–97 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1996) (applying New York law to permit creditors to reach a self-
settled trust that was subject to the law of the Jersey Channel Islands); see also 
Gideon Rothschild, Daniel S. Rubin & Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Self-Settled 
Spendthrift Trusts: Should a Few Bad Apples Spoil the Bunch?, 32 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 763 (1999) (examining the public policy issue); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 270 (1971) (indicating that a choice-of-law 
provision will not be respected in terms of the validity of the trust if it violates a 
strong public policy of the state having the most significant relationship to the 
issue). 
 185. 11 U.S.C. § 548(e)(1) (2012). For a discussion of the history of the 
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transfers to a self-settled trust can be invalidated in bankruptcy 
where the transfer was made within ten years of the bankruptcy 
filing and with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors, 
even if the claim did not arise until after the creation of the 
trust.186 Thus, even if the trust is located in a state that has 
overruled the self-settled trust rule, creditors can nonetheless 
reach the trust’s assets if the requirements of this federal statute 
are satisfied.187 
To the extent that trust assets can be reached by creditors, 
either because the choice-of-law provision is found to be 
inconsistent with the public policy of the settlor’s home state or 
because of the Bankruptcy Code, the estate tax advantages that 
the self-settled trust are designed to offer may prove to be 
unavailable.188 Indeed, it is arguable that the mere possibility 
that a creditor could use one of these theories to reach the trust’s 
assets,189 even if the settlor has no creditors, is sufficient to treat 
                                                                                                     
legislation, see Eason, supra note 180, at 2667–77; Gideon Rothschild, Did 
Bankruptcy Reform Act Close the ‘Loophole’ for the Wealthy?, 107 TAX NOTES 492 
(2005). 
 186. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(e)(1)(D); In re Mortensen, No. A09-00565-DMD, 
2011 WL 5025288 (Bankr. D. Alaska 2011) (invoking § 548(e)(1) of the 
Bankruptcy Code in the case of a self-settled trust located in Alaska). It is worth 
noting that the bankruptcy section carries the negative implication that it 
cannot be used to invalidate a transfer made to a self-settled trust established 
more than ten years before the bankruptcy filing. 
 187. Note that, under the Delaware statute, a person who becomes a creditor 
after the trust is established can reach trust assets if there is a showing that the 
settlor intended to hinder or delay that particular future creditor. Compare DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3572(a) (2005) (indicating that a trust conveyance cannot be 
set aside “unless the qualified disposition was made with actual intent to 
defraud such creditor”), with 11 U.S.C. § 548(e)(1)(D) (explaining that the 
conveyance to the trust can be set aside if the settlor had such intent with 
respect to any future creditor). 
 188. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2009-44-002 (Oct. 3, 2009) (providing that 
assets are deemed includable in the settlor’s gross estate if, as a matter of state 
law (or as a matter of federal bankruptcy law), creditors can reach the assets). 
 189. Some states that have overruled the self-settled trust rule provide 
exceptions that permit creditors with special statuses to reach the trust’s assets. 
For example, in Delaware, certain divorce-related creditors are permitted such 
access. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3573(1) (providing divorce-related 
creditors the ability to access trust assets). It is arguable that if state law 
permits access to any creditor, even where the class of such creditors is narrowly 
circumscribed, the settlor should be treated as owning the trust’s assets for 
estate tax purposes. See 26 C.F.R. § 20.2036-1(b)(2) (2014) (providing that trust 
assets are includable in the settlor’s gross estate if a creditor, not all creditors, 
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the settlor as the owner of the trust’s assets for estate tax 
purposes.190  
Self-settled trust strategies nevertheless remain popular 
throughout the country. In terms of creditor protection, settlors 
justifiably believe that creditors seeking to penetrate the shield 
that the trust provides should bear a rather onerous burden.191 
Establishing that such a shield offends the strong public policy of 
the settlor’s home state could prove to be difficult, particularly 
when one takes into account the fact that many states provide 
creditor protection for self-settled retirement accounts.192 And in 
terms of the provision in the Bankruptcy Code, it can only be 
invoked if bankruptcy occurs within ten years of the trust’s 
creation and, then, only if it is established that the settlor had 
created the trust with the requisite intent.193 Furthermore, the 
IRS has sanctioned the self-settled-trust concept in one context 
implicitly194 and, in another, explicitly,195 suggesting that 
taxpayers’ estate tax objectives are safely within reach using self-
settled asset protection trusts.  
                                                                                                     
can reach the assets under state law). 
 190. But see United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 149 (1972) (indicating 
that I.R.C. § 2036 should not apply where the settlor’s ability to access trust 
assets is speculative); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2009-44-002 (July 25, 2009) (refusing 
to apply Code § 2036 in the case of a self-settled trust located in Alaska in the 
absence of an implied understanding concerning distributions to the settlor). 
 191. See Christopher M. Reimer, The Undiscovered Country: Wyoming’s 
Emergence as a Leading Trust Situs Jurisdiction, 11 WYO. L. REV. 165, 194 
(2011) (“Combined with the advantages of spendthrift protection, self-settled 
trusts are fairly powerful when it comes to asset protection.”). 
 192. See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-3.1 (2014) (stating that 
the same statute that renders self-settled trusts invalid in terms of the settlor’s 
creditors creates an exception for certain self-settled retirement accounts). The 
legislative exception invites the argument that the general rule does not reflect 
a sufficiently strong public policy to warrant disregard of the law designated in 
the instrument. 
 193. See supra note 185 and accompanying text (creating a federalized self-
settled trust rule). 
 194. See supra note 135 and accompanying text (assuming simply that 
creditors could not reach the trust’s assets under state law because, in each 
ruling, the trust was located in a state that had overruled the self-settled trust 
rule). 
 195. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2009-44-002 (Oct. 20, 2009) (refusing to apply 
I.R.C. § 2036 on the basis of creditors’ rights under state law, concluding instead 
that the section would only apply if there was an implied understanding that 
distributions would be made to the settlor). 
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In short, the self-settled-trust strategy remains attractive, 
both as a creditor-protection and an estate-tax-savings device. 
The estate planning bar has thus developed a sophisticated 
repertoire of trust offerings that have come at the expense of 
important societal interests.196 Left unchecked, the types of trusts 
delineated in this section of the analysis can subvert states’ 
income tax systems, undermine the remaining remnants of the 
federal estate tax system, and leave legitimate creditors 
shortchanged.197  
IV. Trust Evolution and Appropriate Governmental Responses 
Over the course of the last century, trusts established in the 
United States were typically designed with one of two purposes 
in mind: mitigation of transfer tax obligations198 and 
conservation of property (i.e., protecting assets from being 
dissipated or wasted by profligate beneficiaries whose profligacy 
would make outright ownership detrimental).199 But with the 
decimation of state and federal transfer taxes,200 a significant 
motivating factor for trust formation now lies fallow. Trust 
settlors who once regularly formed qualified personal residence 
trusts,201 grantor-retained annuity trusts,202 and a whole array 
                                                                                                     
 196. See infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing the generation-skipping transfer tax). 
 197. See infra Part IV.C (recommending solutions to maintain societal 
interests). 
 198. See supra notes 50–54 and accompanying text (discussing tax-saving 
techniques). 
 199. See supra note 9 (explaining that trusts have been used to maintain 
large estates). 
 200. See supra Part III.B (discussing how trusts preserve wealth in family 
bloodlines). 
 201. See Mitchell M. Gans, GRIT’s, GRAT’s, and GRUT’s: Planning and 
Policy, 11 VA. TAX REV. 761, 851–58 (1992) (outlining how taxpayers could 
establish personal residence trusts). See generally Jonathan G. Blattmachr et 
al., Partial Interests—GRATs, GRUTs, QPRTs, TAX MGMT. (BNA) No. 836 (2014) 
(addressing transfers of partial interests in property); Jeremy T. Ware, Using 
QPRTs to Maximum Advantage for Wealthy Clients, 32 EST. PLAN. 34 (2005) 
(discussing how to create trusts in the best interests of wealthy clients); Ameek 
A. Ponda, Using Qualified Personal Residence Trusts, 67 TAX NOTES TODAY 947 
(1995) (providing an overview of qualified personal residence trusts). 
 202. See Lawrence P. Katzenstein, Running the Numbers: An Economic 
Analysis of GRATS and QPRTS, SL078 ALI-ABA 779, 781 (2006) (“Grantor 
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of other trust instruments203 now lack the incentive (i.e., estate 
tax exposure) to form such trusts. As the estate tax threat has 
receded, an entire branch of trust formation is atrophying, and 
the other branch—asset preservation—is attracting more 
attention and undergoing a radical transformation.204  
This Part of the Article explores the shift from transfer-tax-
centric trusts to those that are asset-preservation-centric in 
nature, discusses legislative measures designed to curtail the 
establishment of trusts containing problematic asset preservation 
features, and examines those mechanisms available to better 
align state interests between and among states and with the 
federal government. 
A. Shift from Transfer-Tax- to Asset-Preservation-Centric Trusts 
In the past, asset preservation trust formation was primarily 
geared toward safeguarding assets for the benefit of the settlor’s 
surviving spouse and children.205 So-called marital trusts were 
designed to ensure that a surviving spouse could not gift or 
bequeath a decedent spouse’s assets to a new spouse or the 
offspring of a new relationship.206 In the case of children, so-called 
                                                                                                     
retained annuity trusts (‘GRATs’) and qualified personal residence trusts 
(‘QPRTs’) have become standard weapons in the estate planner’s arsenal.”). See 
generally Steve R. Akers, IRS Blueprint for GRATs, 7 PROB. & PROP. 48 (1993) 
(describing the use of grantor retained annuity trusts). 
 203. See supra notes 49–54 and accompanying text (discussing various types 
of trusts). 
 204. See infra Part IV.A (explaining the shift toward asset preservation 
trusts). 
 205. See, e.g., Bridget J. Crawford, One Flesh, Two Taxpayers: A New 
Approach to Marriage and Wealth Transfer Taxation, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 757, 760 
(2004) (discussing the benefits of marriage under tax law and proposing the 
elimination of the marital deduction); Lauren B. Epstein, Note, The QTIP Trust 
and the Elective Share Trust: Are They Really Parallel?, 53 FLA. L. REV. 965, 970 
(2001) (discussing whether the marital deduction should be allowed in QTIP 
trusts); Wendy C. Gerzog, Symposium: The Illogical and Sexist QTIP Provisions: 
I Just Can’t Say it Ain’t So, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1597, 1600 (1998) (discussing trust 
formation). 
 206. See sources cited supra note 205 (providing information on the martial 
deduction). 
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minor trusts were designed to ensure that the assets they housed 
could not be dissipated or wasted by a spendthrift child.207 
Since the passage of the 2001 Act,208 estate planning 
attorneys have discovered that trust versatility could take the 
asset conservation aspects of trusts to undiscovered heights and 
yield tremendous financial benefits: if trust situs could be 
selected or moved to a legal jurisdiction in which the laws were 
more accommodating, then it could be selected to seek a state 
without an income tax;209 if a trust could be used to protect 
profligate surviving spouses and children from dissipating assets, 
then it could be structured to achieve the same goals for 
grandchildren, great-grandchildren, and more distant 
descendants;210 and, finally, if a trust could protect its 
beneficiaries from pursuing a decadent lifestyle, then it could also 
be designed to protect trust settlors’ assets from the reach of 
creditors.211 
To facilitate the ability of trusts to conserve property, the 
estate planning bar enlisted the support of state legislatures. 
Arguments launched in favor of these legislative reforms focused 
on how these trust reforms would strengthen the ability of trusts 
to fulfill their historic role as asset conservators.212 In the eyes of 
many state legislators, packaging of this sort proved compelling; 
as a result, numerous trust reform measures have been routinely 
passed and signed into law.213 More specifically, over the course of 
the last several years, state legislatures have passed legislation 
                                                                                                     
 207. See Eason, supra note 180, at 2622; Erwin N. Griswold, Reaching the 
Interest of the Beneficiary of a Spendthrift Trust, 43 HARV. L. REV. 63, 65 (1929) 
(providing a historical overview). 
 208. See supra note 64 (explaining the components of the legislation). 
 209. See supra Part III.A (discussing reductions of state income tax 
burdens). 
 210. See supra Part III.B (describing ways to maintain wealth within 
families). 
 211. See supra Part III.C (providing an overview of how to protect assets 
from creditors). 
 212. See, e.g., Wagenfeld, supra note 175, at 851–66 (exploring the 
underlying motivations of why states adopted asset preservation legislation and 
explaining that in Alaska the legislation was designed to attract trust 
protectors). 
 213. See supra Part III (discussing common trust reform measures). 
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facilitating trust situs establishment,214 eliminating or 
emasculating the rule against perpetuities,215 and enhancing 
asset protection.216  
There did not appear to be anything nefarious motivating 
reform sponsors; to the contrary, they seemed intent on 
strengthening one of the historic linchpins of trust formation.217 
Members of state legislatures who have passed these “reforms” 
certainly appear to harbor no regrets and, in fact, on many 
occasions have issued prideful messages of their trust reform 
achievements.218  
The combination of the recent legislative measures has 
fundamentally transformed the trust landscape. By offering 
clients the possibility of income tax savings, transfer tax 
elimination, and creditor protection, the estate planning bar can 
claim renewed value for its services.  
B. Recommended State and Federal Reforms 
With the fiscal horizons of many states and the federal 
government marred by burgeoning deficits,219 legislators must be 
vigilant about the challenges stemming from the recent evolution 
of trust instruments. The private enrichment that these newly 
                                                                                                     
 214. See supra Part III.A (providing an overview of state tax deductions and 
eliminations). 
 215. See supra Part III.B (discussing the rule against perpetuities in 
conjunction with the generation-skipping transfer tax). 
 216. See supra Part III.C (outlining how to protect assets from creditors). 
 217. See, e.g., Wagenfeld, supra note 175, at 858 (explaining some of the 
Alaskan legislature’s motivations). 
 218. See, e.g., id. at 851 (“The drafters of Delaware’s legislation expressly 
stated their intent to maintain Delaware’s status as ‘the most favored domestic 
jurisdiction for the establishment of trusts.’”). 
 219. See, e.g., NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N & NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET 
OFFICERS, THE FISCAL SURVEY OF STATES: AN UPDATE OF STATE FISCAL 
CONDITIONS, at vii (Spring 2012), http://www.nga.org/files/live/sites/NGA/ 
files/pdf/FSS1206.PDF (leaving states to “solve a combined $146.3 billion in 
budget gaps over the two year time period”); UPDATED BUDGET PROJECTIONS 
2014–2024, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE (Apr. 14, 2014), http://www.cbo. 
gov/publication/45229 (last visited Jan. 27, 2015) (projecting significant federal 
budget deficits for the foreseeable future) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
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minted trusts offer often comes at tremendous financial costs to 
the public and thus warrants reform.220 
In the sections below, this analysis describes specific 
legislative courses of action that state governments and the 
federal government can use to defeat suspect trust use. 
1. Safeguarding State Income Tax Coffers  
In an effort to mitigate their tax burdens, some taxpayers 
who reside in states that impose income taxes strategically park 
income-producing assets in trusts in those states that do not 
impose income taxes.221 Utilization of this stratagem can produce 
revenue shortfalls in those states that levy an income tax.222 To 
safeguard government coffers, either Congress or state 
legislatures should take steps to eradicate this problem.223  
On the federal level, Congress can institute legislation that 
treats any contribution made into a trust—other than a grantor 
trust—as a completed gift. In 2001, in anticipation of the one-
year federal estate tax suspension in 2010, Congress passed such 
legislation. Embodied in Code § 2511(c),224 this legislation 
declared that all contributions into nongrantor trusts would 
constitute completed gifts. Had this legislation gone into effect,225 
it would have dampened taxpayers’ willingness to contribute 
                                                                                                     
 220. See infra Part IV.C (discussing proposed reforms). 
 221. See Lawrence W. Waggoner, Congress Should Impose a Two-Generation 
Limit on the GST Exemption: Here’s Why 2 (U. Mich. Pub. Law, Working Paper 
No. 205, 2010) (discussing how the GST exemption has allowed taxpayers to 
evade income taxes). 
 222. See id. (“The loss of tax revenue will become more and more significant 
as time goes along.”). 
 223. See Steve J. Horowitz & Robert H. Sitkoff, Unconstitutional Perpetual 
Trusts, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1769 (2014) (suggesting that another approach, on the 
basis of state constitutions, is to challenge judicially the recognition of perpetual 
trusts). 
 224. See Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. 
No. 107-16, § 511, 115 Stat. 38 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 
U.S.C.) (changing the effect of nongrantor trusts). 
 225. See Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job 
Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, § 302(e), 124 Stat. 3296 (repealing 
§ 2511(c) and thereby dampening the ability of taxpayers to evade income 
taxes). 
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assets into trusts that are designed to effectuate income tax 
savings. The reason is twofold. As a result of the gift being 
deemed complete, depending on the dollar value of the trust 
contribution and the amount of the taxpayer’s prior taxable gifts, 
there would have been the risk of immediate gift tax exposure.226 
Second, insofar as the tax basis of the transferred asset is 
concerned, the carryover tax basis rule would apply;227 
application of this rule enhances the risk that greater federal and 
state income taxes will be imposed upon the subsequent 
disposition of the transferred trust asset. However, when 
Congress decided to retain the federal estate tax, Code § 2511(c) 
was repealed.228 This repeal left the door wide open for taxpayers 
to continue to park income-producing assets strategically in those 
trust jurisdictions that impose no income tax. 
If Congress refuses to take remedial action, states that 
impose an income tax can take unilateral measures to try to 
protect the integrity of their tax bases. Consider the recent case 
of New York State.229 In an attempt to safeguard its coffers, using 
the now-repealed Code § 2511(c) as a model, it fashioned 
legislation that identifies as grantor trusts all trusts into which 
incomplete gifts are made.230 Because grantor trust status 
requires trust income to be included in the settlor’s gross income, 
New York residents who now establish ING trusts will no longer 
be able to achieve their objective.231 
Given the fact that Congress has no direct economic stake in 
how states vie for trust business, it is unlikely that it will enact 
universal reforms. However, as exemplified by New York, states 
                                                                                                     
 226. See I.R.C. § 2501 (2012) (creating the federal gift tax). 
 227. See id. § 1015(a) (establishing the method to determine the value of the 
gift). This is far less favorable than the basis-equal-to-fair-market-value rule 
applicable upon death. Id. § 1014(a). 
 228. See Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job 
Creation Act § 302(e) (revoking section 2511(c)). 
 229. See N.Y. TAX LAW § 612(b)(41) (McKinney 2014) (adjusting gross income 
of an individual resident). 
 230. See id. (establishing a broad definition of grantor trust). 
 231. See id. (treats ING trusts as grantor trusts for New York income tax 
purposes, thereby subjecting the grantors of such trusts to New York income 
tax). 
298 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 257 (2015) 
can enact legislative measures to stymie other states’ competitive 
tactics.232 
2. Making the Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax Universal 
The estate tax is supposed to be levied at each generational 
level. To achieve this goal, Congress designed the GST tax to 
eliminate the ability of taxpayers to defer estate tax imposition 
for decades to come by imposing a tax—in addition to gift and 
estate tax—on wealth transfers made to beneficiaries two or more 
generations removed from a taxpayer.233 When Congress 
introduced the GST tax,234 it also offered a modest $1 million GST 
exemption.235  
At the time, the adjective modest was a fitting description of 
the GST exemption amount because opportunities to leverage 
this exemption amount were limited: under the rule against 
perpetuities, which was then ubiquitous throughout the United 
States),236 the wealth funding these trusts could not cascade down 
the generations for millennia to come, escaping transfer tax at 
every juncture along the way. Placing implicit reliance on the 
rule against perpetuities, Congress assumed that wealth 
transferred into a trust would generally vest with taxpayers’ 
grandchildren or great-grandchildren and then, once again, face 
transfer tax exposure.  
But from the time when the GST tax first came into 
existence, the legal landscape has dramatically changed. The 
GST exemption amount is currently $5.34 million and is annually 
adjusted for inflation.237 Given the size of this exemption and the 
                                                                                                     
 232. See id. (stymieing the benefits of an ING trust).  
 233. See supra note 32 (discussing the generation-skipping transfer tax). 
 234. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, §§ 1431–33, 100 Stat. 
2712, 2717 (retroactively replacing the old GST tax, Tax Reform Act of 1976, 
§§ 2006–22, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520, due to its complex nature). 
 235. See id. § 1431(a) (creating the GST exemption). 
 236. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., OPTIONS TO 
IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES 394 (Comm. Print 
2005) (“When Congress originally enacted a tax on generation-skipping 
transfers, it noted that ‘[m]ost States have a rule against perpetuities which 
limits the duration of a trust.’”). 
 237. See IRS Rev. Proc. 2013-35, 2013-47, I.R.B. 537 (describing various tax 
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fact that many states have eliminated or greatly curtailed their 
rule against perpetuities,238 taxpayers are now at liberty to 
establish trusts with significant amounts of wealth shielded from 
transfer tax imposition for many generations.239 
Assuming that Congress wants to maintain the integrity of 
the federal transfer tax system and that perpetual trusts 
contravene achievement of this objective, there are at least three 
legislative measures that it should consider adopting. 
First, Congress should prohibit generation-skipping 
exemption allocation to trust beneficiaries who are three or more 
generations below that of the taxpayer (e.g., great-
grandchildren).240 Allocation of the GST exemption to such 
distant generations magnifies the power of such an exemption in 
ways that Congress could never have envisioned. Presumably, 
Congress enacted the GST tax and the accompanying GST 
exemption to enable taxpayers to make modest gifts or bequests 
to their grandchildren without these recipients effectively having 
to bear two transfer taxes (i.e., an estate tax as well as the GST 
tax). The GST exemption was never intended to enable taxpayers 
to transfer wealth to more distant generations that taxpayers 
would presumably never know (great-great-grandchildren and 
more distant descendants). 
A second legislative measure that Congress should consider 
adopting is a significant reduction of the GST exemption amount. 
Assuming that Congress does not want the vast majority of 
taxpayers to be subject to the estate tax, raising the applicable 
                                                                                                     
exemptions). 
 238. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE 
TRANSFERS, at ch. 27, intro. n. (2011) (cataloging state statutes). 
 239. See, e.g., Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual 
Trust, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1303, 1318 (2003) (describing problems associated with 
perpetual trusts); Grayson M.P. McCouch, Who Killed the Rule Against 
Perpetuities?, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1291, 1295 (2013) (analyzing the relationship 
between the rule against perpetuities and federal transfer taxes); Schanzenbach 
& Sitkoff, supra note 152, at 2476 (concluding that the GST tax created an 
increase in perpetual trusts); Sterk, Judicial Interpretation, supra note 143, at 
2099 (defining the rule against perpetuities); Angela M. Vallario, Death by a 
Thousand Cuts: The Rule Against Perpetuities, 25 J. LEGIS. 141, 148 (1999) 
(analyzing legislation abolishing the rule against perpetuities). 
 240. See Lawrence W. Waggoner, Effectively Curbing the GST Exemption for 
Perpetual Trusts, 135 TAX NOTES 1267 (2012) (calling for Congress to prohibit 
GST tax exemption allocation to trusts that endure past two generations). 
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exclusion amount (i.e., the amount that can pass free of estate 
tax) is imminently sensible. Yet, increasing the GST exemption to 
the same dollar amount as the applicable exclusion amount lacks 
any common sense: Congress should not incentivize taxpayers to 
make significant gifts and bequests to skip people—primarily 
grandchildren and more distant descendants—and thereby 
bypass transfer tax for an additional generation or generations to 
come. 
A third alternative legislative measure for Congress to 
consider is the enactment of a federal rule against perpetuities. 
The Obama administration recently made such a proposal.241 To 
date, however, this proposal has not gained any legislative 
traction.242 
By not keeping the use of the GST exemption and its amount 
in check, Congress has allowed dynasty trusts to flourish.243 
Thus, as part of their repertoire, members of the estate planning 
bar routinely establish such trusts. But, down the road, havoc 
awaits. As explained by Professor Lawrence W. Waggoner, in the 
absence of a rule against perpetuities and a limited GST 
exemption amount, the number of beneficiaries that these 
dynasty trusts generate is stunning: for example, after 150 years, 
a dynasty trust “could have 450 beneficiaries; after 250 years, 
over 7,000 beneficiaries; after 350 years, 114,500 beneficiaries.”244 
Each beneficiary represents a lost opportunity for tax collection. 
Clearly, dynasty trusts represent an astronomical financial loss 
for the government.245  
                                                                                                     
 241. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE 
ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2013 REVENUE PROPOSALS 81–82 (2012) 
(proposing a ninety-year limit on GST exemption). 
 242. See Dennis I. Belcher et al., Federal Tax Rules Should Not Be Used to 
Limit Trust Duration, 136 TAX NOTES 833, 833 (2012) (arguing that trust 
duration is a state, not federal, law issue). 
 243. See supra Part III.B (discussing how dynasty trusts preserve wealth 
within family bloodlines). 
 244. Lawrence W. Waggoner, Message to Congress: Halt the Tax Exemption 
for Perpetual Trusts, 109 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 23, 24 (2010). 
 245. See id. (discussing the number of beneficiaries generated by dynasty 
trusts in the absence of a rule against perpetuities). 
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3. Eliminating Self-Settled Asset Protection Trusts 
While state law can generally be a critical predicate on which 
to base federal law,246 problematic results can occur when 
Congress places too much reliance on state law.247 In the self-
settled trust context, in both the Internal Revenue and 
Bankruptcy Codes, Congress has made state law 
determinative.248 As a result, settlors are free to locate their self-
settled trusts in jurisdictions that enable them to accomplish 
their tax-and-creditor-related objectives, producing distortion and 
inequity. To remedy this distortion and restore equity, in 
determining the appropriate treatment of self-settled trusts, 
Congress should make state law considerations irrelevant.  
a. Estate Tax Considerations 
Recall that the estate tax treatment of self-settled trusts 
depends on their treatment under state law.249 In general, if state 
law permits the settlor’s creditors to reach the trust’s assets, the 
trust is ignored for estate tax purposes, and all of the trust’s 
assets are included in the settlor’s gross estate under Code 
§ 2036.250 Conversely, if state law does not permit creditors access 
and there is no implied understanding between the settlor and 
trustee regarding future trust distributions, there is no estate tax 
inclusion provided the settlor retains no other access to, or control 
                                                                                                     
 246. For example, in the estate tax context, the decedent’s property rights 
under state law will often determine their estate tax treatment. See, e.g., 
Comm’r v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967) (supplying the methodology 
for determining the content of state law for federal estate tax purposes); Morgan 
v. Comm’r, 309 U.S. 78, 80 (1940) (indicating that the estate tax is determined 
on the basis of rights under state law). 
 247. See Mitchell M. Gans, Federal Transfer Taxation and the Role of State 
Law: Does the Marital Deduction Strike the Proper Balance?, 48 EMORY L.J. 871, 
876–83 (1999) (discussing the consequences of an overemphasis on state law). 
 248. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (2012) (“A restriction on the transfer of a 
beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust that is enforceable under applicable 
nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a case under this title.”). 
 249. See infra notes 250–251 and accompanying text (discussing the 
consequences if state law does or does not allow creditor access to trust assets). 
 250. See Estate of Paxton v. Comm’r, 86 T.C. 785, 814–15 (1986) (applying 
I.R.C. § 2036 based, in part, on the right of the settlor’s creditors to reach trust 
assets under state law). 
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over, the trust.251 In thus linking the estate tax treatment of self-
settled trusts to their state law treatment, Congress 
unintentionally sanctioned the self-settled trust tax strategy.  
But Congress could easily defeat this strategy in the 
following manner. It could amend Code § 2036 to provide that 
whenever a trustee is given discretion to make distributions to 
the settlor, the trust’s assets must be included in the settlor’s 
gross estate. This change would constitute a significant 
expansion of this Code section’s scope: inclusion would be 
required even if creditors did not have access to trust assets and 
even if there was no understanding regarding trust distributions 
to be made to the settlor.252 If enacted, this proposed amendment 
would render the self-settled trust strategy ineffectual regardless 
of the state in which the trust were located, eliminating the 
distortion and inequity that stems from the ability of settlors to 
locate their trusts opportunistically in states with settlor-friendly 
legislation.253  
                                                                                                     
 251. See, e.g., Estate of McNichol v. Comm’r, 265 F.2d 667, 673 (3d Cir. 
1959) (concluding that an understanding that is not legally enforceable is 
nevertheless sufficient to trigger inclusion under the predecessor of I.R.C. 
§ 2036 based on Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. 632 (1949)); Rev. 
Rul. 2004-64 (indicating that, in general, I.R.C. § 2036 will not apply if there is 
no implied or express understanding and if state law does not provide the 
settlor’s creditors with access to trust assets). 
 252. This would have the salutary effect of eliminating litigation on the 
factual question of whether the settlor had an understanding with the trustee—
an often nettlesome question for the judiciary to resolve. Traditionally, the 
estate bore the burden of proving the absence of an understanding, but under 
I.R.C. § 7491 the Tax Court has recently shifted the burden to the IRS. See 
Estate of Van v. Comm’r, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1077 (2011) (shifting the burden to 
the IRS on the question of an understanding).  
 253. The proposal would only affect I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1), not I.R.C. 
§ 2036(a)(2). Under I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1), at present, inclusion is required if (i) the 
settlor had a legally enforceable right to the trust’s income; (ii) the settlor could, 
as a result of state law, relegate creditors to the trust; or (iii) the settlor could 
receive trust distributions under an implied or express understanding with the 
trustee that need not be legally enforceable. In contrast, under I.R.C. 
§ 2036(a)(2), inclusion is only appropriate if the settlor had a legally enforceable 
right to control trust assets. See United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 136 
(1972) (indicating that I.R.C. § 2036(a)(2) can only be applied if the settlor 
possessed a legally enforceable right).  
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b.  Creditor-Protection Considerations 
Congress should recognize the fact that even if Code § 2036 
were amended to eliminate the self-settled trust as a tax strategy, 
self-settled trusts would continue to be used as a creditor-
protection strategy.254 In other words, settlors concerned about 
future creditors, not tax, would still be attracted to states with 
settlor-friendly legislation. As in the case of the estate tax, the 
ability of settlors to take advantage of such legislation is made 
possible by the linkage between federal (bankruptcy) and state 
law.255  
Recall that common and statutory laws permit a settlor to 
confer spendthrift protection on a trust for the benefit of someone 
other than the settlor.256 For example, a father might create a 
trust for the benefit of his son and include a spendthrift provision 
in the instrument based upon a concern about the son’s ability to 
be financially prudent. The effect of the spendthrift provision is to 
prevent the son’s creditors from reaching the trust’s assets while 
the assets are in the hands of the trustee. Given the 
understandable desire of settlors to protect trust assets from 
beneficiaries’ creditors, it is a rare trust that fails to include 
spendthrift protection. Indeed, in at least one state, under a 
statutory default rule, all trusts enjoy spendthrift protection.257 
Perhaps because the spendthrift concept is so well ingrained in 
state law, the Bankruptcy Code has embraced the concept, 
providing that assets in a trust entitled to spendthrift protection 
under state law are not available to the creditors of the bankrupt 
beneficiary.258 Simply put, if spendthrift protection is available 
under state law, it is concomitantly available in the bankruptcy 
context. 
                                                                                                     
 254. See Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts, supra note 167, at 1043 (discussing 
self-settled trusts). 
 255. See infra note 258 (noting the link between federal bankruptcy law and 
state law). 
 256. See sources cited supra note 9 (discussing trusts as a means for asset 
preservation). 
 257. See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-1.5 (McKinney 2014) (making 
spendthrift protection the default rule).  
 258. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (2012) (respecting, for bankruptcy purposes, 
spendthrift protection conferred under state law). 
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Historically, notwithstanding the esteem in which 
spendthrift provisions are held in the Bankruptcy Code, the 
settlor’s interest in a self-settled trust could not be spendthrift 
protected under state law.259 Even if the settlor explicitly 
provided in the instrument that her interest was entitled to 
spendthrift protection, the settlor’s creditors could nonetheless 
reach the trust’s assets.260 Under state law, an important 
distinction was thus made between self-settled trusts and third-
party trusts: spendthrift protection could only be secured in the 
latter case.261  
This historic distinction between self-settled trusts and third-
party trusts is absent in the Bankruptcy Code. Instead, the 
Bankruptcy Code simply defers to state law, sanctioning 
spendthrift provisions if they are respected under state law.262 It 
is this failure that has made it possible for states to enact 
legislation that enables settlors to secure protection in 
bankruptcy for their interest in self-settled trusts. Put 
differently, had the language of the Bankruptcy Code made 
spendthrift provisions ineffectual in the case of self-settled trusts, 
state legislatures would have been rendered impotent to provide 
creditor protection in bankruptcy for such trusts.  
In 2005, when Congress considered the bankruptcy 
implications of self-settled trusts, it left intact the existing 
spendthrift provision legislation,263 making it possible for settlors 
to continue using these trusts for creditor-protection purposes. It 
did enact a new provision, however, under which transfers to a 
self-settled trust could be set aside if made within ten years of the 
filing of the bankruptcy petition and with the “intent to hinder, 
delay, or defraud” creditors.264 But this was a modest attempt to 
                                                                                                     
 259. See supra notes 168–170 and accompanying text (discussing spendthrift 
protection and self-settled trusts). 
 260. Id. 
 261. See supra notes 167–168 and accompanying text (describing the 
historical distinction between self-settled and third-party trusts). 
 262. See supra note 174 (discussing that outright gifts and gifts in trust can 
be set aside by creditors if the gift constitutes a fraudulent conveyance or 
transfer). 
 263. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (2012) (“A restriction on the transfer of a 
beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust that is enforceable under applicable 
nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a case under this title.”). 
 264. Id. § 548(e)(1).  
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eliminate the self-settled trust as a creditor-protection 
strategy.265 Indeed, if a settlor does not file within ten years or, 
alternatively, is able to show a benign intent in establishing the 
trust, the trust’s assets remain insulated from creditors in 
bankruptcy.266 
As in the tax context, the linkage between federal and state 
law results in distortion and inequity, encouraging settlors to 
locate their self-settled trusts in settlor-friendly jurisdictions and 
giving such settlors an advantage over creditors. Congress should 
end this linkage: it should amend the Bankruptcy Code to deny 
spendthrift protection in the case of self-settled trusts without 
regard to their treatment under state law. The use of self-settled 
trusts would thereby come to a quick end.  
4. Alignment of Governmental Interests 
Among the many things that this analysis highlights is the 
fact that states are constantly competing against one another 
and, to promote the economic well-being of their citizenry, are 
even willing to make legislative changes that are clearly 
detrimental to the well-being of the federal government—or even 
contrary to their own policy concerns.  
This is not something new or novel: since the nation’s 
founding, states have enacted measures designed to either 
promote their provincial economic interests or to safeguard their 
industries.267 And the nation’s courts routinely have had to 
examine whether these protectionist measures violate the U.S. 
Constitution’s Commerce Clause, which gives Congress exclusive 
                                                                                                     
 265. Other proposals would have more severely limited the use of self-settled 
trusts. For example, in the course of the debate over the 2005 legislation, 
Senator Charles E. Schumer proposed an amendment that would have set aside 
all transfers to self-settled trusts made within ten years of filing a bankruptcy 
petition “to the extent the aggregate amount of all such transfers exceeded 
$125,000.” Eason, supra 180, at 2671–72. 
 266. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(e)(1) (2012) (outlining the ten-year provision). 
 267. See, e.g., Kirk J. Stark & Daniel J. Wilson, What Do We Know About the 
Interstate Economic Effects of State Tax Incentives?, 4 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
133, 134–35 (2006) (stating that soon after the Declaration of Independence was 
signed, “[t]hrough self-centered currency policies, impost duties, and other tariff 
measures, states sought to protect in-state industry and raise revenue through 
taxing measures that burdened out-of-state residents”). 
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powers over interstate commerce,268 and decide whether to 
prohibit states from improperly burdening or discriminating 
against interstate commerce—a judicial doctrine proverbially 
known as the negative Commerce Clause or dormant Commerce 
Clause.269 In some cases, courts have ruled that these 
protectionist measures do not interfere with the nation’s 
commerce in a material fashion; accordingly, they have withstood 
constitutional scrutiny.270 In other cases, however, courts have 
                                                                                                     
 268. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 (“To regulate commerce with foreign 
nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes . . . .”). 
 269. For exhaustive examinations of the dormant Commerce Clause, see 
generally Richard B. Collins, Economic Union as a Constitutional Value, 63 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 43 (1988) (providing “an in-depth defense of the dormant 
commerce power doctrine”); Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce 
Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425 (1982) (arguing for “a radically diminished role 
for both the dormant commerce clause and the Court as its interpreter”); 
Michael A. Lawrence, Toward a More Coherent Dormant Commerce Clause: A 
Proposed Unitary Framework, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 395 (1998) (“The 
Unitary Framework does just what its name suggests—it incorporates the 
various dormant-commerce-clause principles laid out by the Court and leading 
scholarly works and consolidates them into a hybrid unitary taxonomy suitable 
for use with both existing and prospective cases.”); Saul Levmore, Interstate 
Exploitation and Judicial Intervention, 69 VA. L. REV. 563 (1983) (“The major 
purpose of this article is to show that the distinction between ‘interferences’ and 
‘exploitations’ has descriptive and normative value in understanding the judicial 
response to interstate trade barriers.”); Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court 
and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 
MICH. L. REV. 1091 (1986) (“The claim I am most concerned to establish is my 
claim that in this area the Court is concerned and should be concerned only with 
preventing purposeful protectionism.”); Robert A. Sedler, The Negative 
Commerce Clause as a Restriction on State Regulation and Taxation: An 
Analysis in Terms of Constitutional Structure, 31 WAYNE L. REV. 885 (1985) 
(discussing the Commerce Clause as the source of constitutional limits on the 
power of the states to regulate and tax entities engaged in interstate commerce); 
Maxwell L. Stearns, A Beautiful Mend: A Game Theoretical Analysis of the 
Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2003) 
(explaining the relationship between the dormant Commerce Clause and the 
various forms of state law rent seeking); Mark Tushnet, Rethinking the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 WIS. L. REV. 125 (1979) (“[T]his article seeks to 
return the dormant Commerce Clause from its position of isolation and 
incoherence to be reintegrated with the rest of the Constitution.”); Jonathan D. 
Varat, State “Citizenship” and Interstate Equality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 487 (1981) 
(“Any effort to develop appropriate principles to govern [issues of interstate 
equality] should attempt to give each feature its due and should, therefore, be 
sensitive both to the character of state ‘citizenship’ and to the imperatives of 
interstate equality.”). 
 270. See, e.g., United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. 
Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 347 (2007) (holding that incidental burden on interstate 
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ruled that protectionist measures do materially interfere with the 
nation’s commerce, and, accordingly, they have not withstood 
constitutional scrutiny.271 
But state legislative measures designed to attract the type of 
capital that this analysis describes are of an entirely different ilk. 
Rather than erecting direct barriers to commerce, many states 
have instead adopted competitive legislative measures that 
sanction individual wealth preservation and eschew restrictions 
on its use.272 Because the nature of these measures is only 
indirectly related to commerce—defined in Black’s Law 
Dictionary as “[t]he exchange of goods, productions, or property of 
any kind; the buying selling, and exchanging of articles”273—they 
should not be protected at all by the Constitution.  
Granted, the nation’s founders promoted competition 
between and among the states.274 Via such competition, public-
sector innovations would supposedly arise as states sought to 
compete in the marketplace by offering favorable business 
                                                                                                     
commerce that resulted from application of county flow control ordinances was 
not clearly excessive in relation to public benefits provided in the form of 
increased recycling). 
 271. See, e.g., City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978) (holding 
invalid New Jersey’s Waste Control Act, which prohibited the importation of 
most “solid or liquid waste which originated or was collected outside the 
territorial limits of the State”); Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 
U.S. 333, 353–54 (1977) (holding invalid a North Carolina law that sought to 
protect its apple growers); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, Wis., 340 U.S. 349, 
356–57 (1951) (holding invalid a municipal ordinance requiring all milk sold in 
Madison to be pasteurized at an approved plant within five miles of the city). 
See generally Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce 
Clause Constraints on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377 
(1996) (“In this Article, Professor Enrich argues that these state location 
incentives harm the states and their citizens, and that the Commerce Clause 
may present the only possible realistic restraint . . . .”). 
 272. See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-1.5 (McKinney 2014) (making 
spendthrift protection the default rule). 
 273. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 325 (10th ed. 2014). 
 274. See Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ 
Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1498 (1987) (“A consolidated national 
government has all the drawbacks of a monopoly: it stifles choice and lacks the 
goal of competition.”); H. Geoffrey Moulton Jr., Federalism and Choice of Law in 
the Regulation of Legal Ethics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 73, 132 (1997) (“In short, 
competitive federalism forces governments to be more efficient by improving 
services, reducing costs, and better assessing citizen preferences for public 
goods.”). 
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climates with low taxes and the support of important government 
services such as garbage removal and proper sewage treatment. 
In other words, state competition would incubate good ideas and 
cultivate economic efficiencies.275 This philosophy, combined with 
the Tenth Amendment’s delegation of certain rights and 
privileges to the states, makes it difficult to imagine the federal 
government establishing laws that are traditionally in the state 
realm (e.g., Congress defining the parameters of property 
ownership in the form of a federal rule against perpetuities).276  
However, because the members of various state legislatures 
invariably are incapable of metaphorically holding hands with 
members of other state legislatures and making mutual 
concessions (there are simply too many state legislatures with 
different histories, agendas, and cultural fabrics), Congress 
sometimes does—and should—feel compelled to intervene.  
By way of example, consider the history of state death taxes, 
which is emblematic of the difficulties associated with collective 
action between and among state legislatures. In the early part of 
the twentieth century, state death taxes were a revenue staple for 
many state governments.277 However, this all changed when 
Florida repealed its state death tax and then ran a well-
publicized campaign to attract retirees to the state.278 Not to be 
outdone, other states then sought parity with Florida and 
repealed their state death taxes.279 Because a large percentage of 
                                                                                                     
 275. See, e.g., David L. Markell, States as Innovators: It’s Time for a New 
Look to Our “Laboratories of Democracy” in the Effort to Improve Our Approach 
to Environmental Regulation, 58 ALB. L. REV. 347, 353–55 (1994) (stating that 
states, not the federal government, appear to be creating the most innovative 
regulatory regimes). 
 276. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 729 (1999) (noting that 
restraints on federal power are “fundamental postulates implicit in the 
constitutional design”). For a strikingly contrary view, see generally Calvin H. 
Johnson, States’ Rights? What States’ Rights?: Implying Limitations on the 
Federal Government from the Overall Design, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 225 (2009) (“In 
recent years, the Supreme Court has been finding and strengthening judicial 
doctrines constraining the federal government in favor of the states, in ways 
which have no specific justification in the constitutional text.”). 
 277. See Eugene E. Oakes, Development of American State Death Taxes, 26 
IOWA L. REV. 451, 455–68 (1941) (describing tax measures in different states and 
motives for such measures). 
 278. See Perkins, supra note 37, at 271–72 (explaining the depth of this 
national campaign to attract wealthy retirees).  
 279. See, e.g., JAMES A. MAXWELL, THE FISCAL IMPACT OF FEDERALISM IN THE 
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states relied heavily on state death taxes as a revenue source and 
the threat of universal repeal loomed large, state leaders—in 
particular, William Bailey, president of the National Tax 
Association—convened a convention to discuss what could be 
done to salvage state death taxes.280 What this convention—and 
two subsequent ones—decided was that congressional action was 
imperative to preserve the state tax revenue base.281 The 
proposed solution was for the federal government to enact a state 
death credit as part of the federal estate tax to incentivize states 
to enact their own state death tax equal, at least, to the federal 
state death credit.282 Implementing such state death taxes would 
not constitute an additional tax burden because the state death 
tax due would offset dollar-for-dollar the amount that would 
otherwise be due to the federal government. Most states, 
including even Florida, responded to this cue by enacting state 
death taxes equal to the federal state death tax credit.283 
The effects of competition can also be corrosive beyond the 
realm of state death taxes. Certainly, in terms of asset 
preservation legislation related to trust instruments, this has 
been the case.284 These “race-to-the-bottom” state legislative 
competitions put government coffers at risk while enriching those 
taxpayers who are economically well-to-do and who can afford the 
services of the estate planning bar. Indeed, trust asset 
preservation legislation is the exact antithesis of the kind of 
legislation that should be enacted—legislation such that “after 
balancing competing interests, it is determined that a societal 
                                                                                                     
UNITED STATES 333 (1946) (discussing the fact that in 1925 Nevada added an 
amendment to its constitution prohibiting the imposition of state death taxes). 
 280. See Jeffrey A. Cooper, Interstate Competition and State Death Taxes: A 
Modern Crisis in Historical Perspective, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 835, 851–52 (2006) 
(discussing the First National Conference on Inheritance and Estate Taxation). 
 281. See id. at 856–57 (providing the relevant recommendation of the Delano 
Committee Report from the First Conference). 
 282. See id. (describing these same recommendations). 
 283. See Oakes, supra note 277, at 469 (“The crediting device made it 
expedient for the states to adopt legislation which would absorb the full amount 
of the credit that a taxpayer could claim under the federal law.”). 
 284. See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-1.5 (McKinney 2014) (making 
spendthrift protection the default rule). 
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benefit can be achieved (beyond the mere transfer of wealth to a 
politically powerful group).”285  
As this analysis demonstrates, aligning governmental 
interests is a daunting task. However, perseverance is critical. 
Admittedly, provincial state laws that come at the revenue 
expense of other states keep the estate planning bar bustling, but 
this is a slim justification to retain laws that produce inequities 
and benefit the wealthy, who can afford such services. State 
legislatures and Congress must defeat state legislation that is 
designed to enable one state to prosper largely at the expense of 
other states and the federal government. It is imperative that 
federal and state governments remain solvent so that essential 
government services are provided. Much is at stake; thus, action 
must be taken to align government interests or to force 
conformity.  
C. Recommendations 
1. State Action to Protect Against Other States’ Laws 
If the option is available, state legislatures can enact 
measures to protect themselves from the revenue-siphoning laws 
of other states. As a case study, consider the recent experience of 
the state of New York and how it has responded to its taxpayers 
establishing trusts in out-of-state jurisdictions that have no 
income tax. It enacted a law that classifies as a “grantor trust” 
any contribution into a trust that is incomplete for federal gift tax 
purposes.286 This law erects a barrier that may dissuade 
taxpayers from engaging in this tax-circumvention strategy. The 
salient point is that, in the appropriate situations, state 
legislatures whose revenue base is at risk are not powerless to 
combat the actions of other state legislatures.   
                                                                                                     
 285. Gans, supra note 201, at 882 n.44. 
 286. N.Y. TAX LAW § 612(b)(41) (McKinney 2014). 
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2. Congressional Action to Further Intrastate Conformity 
When states cannot protect themselves from other states’ 
internecine legislative measures and when such measures have 
the potential to harm the government and/or public (e.g., when 
critical funding for essential governmental services are at risk), 
Congress should institute legislation that spurs conformity 
between and among the states. Apparently, in the 1920s, this was 
the case with respect to the state death tax, which at the time 
was a vital funding mechanism of state governments.287 With the 
solvency of several state governments in jeopardy, Congress took 
action and enacted a state death tax credit;288 this generated a 
groundswell of uniformity between and among the state 
legislatures, which enacted state death taxes to match the federal 
state death tax credit.289 The salient point here is that, in the 
appropriate situations, Congress is at liberty to prod state 
legislatures to bring state laws into conformity.  
3. Congressional Action to Prevent Financially Threatening State 
Laws 
In those instances when state legislatures take direct aim at 
the coffers of the federal government, Congress should pass 
measures that defeat these attacks. Consider those states that 
either eliminated or greatly curtailed the application of the rule 
against perpetuities.290 The agenda of these state legislatures was 
simple: attract capital to their states, even though such 
legislation would clearly undermine the integrity of the federal 
estate tax.291 To date, Congress has not responded, which has 
                                                                                                     
 287. See Oakes, supra note 277, at 459–60 (noting that state death tax 
revenues steeply climbed from $710,000 in 1886 to $31 million by 1916).  
 288. See Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, § 301(b), 43 Stat. 253, 304 
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enabled wealthy taxpayers to continue to exploit this loophole 
and allowed billions of dollars to escape estate tax exposure, 
potentially for centuries to come.292 Congress has the ability, 
however, to restore estate tax integrity by eliminating taxpayers’ 
ability to allocate GST tax exemption to those trusts whose 
benefits inure to skip people three or more generations removed 
from the settlor.293 The salient point that stems from this 
recommendation is that, in the appropriate situations, Congress 
holds a trump card in its hands in the form of measures that can 
defeat state laws that put the federal coffers at risk.  
V. Conclusion 
As federal and state transfer taxes have ebbed in importance, 
the estate planning bar has been actively reconfiguring trusts to 
achieve a whole assortment of new goals. While these goals vary 
greatly in nature, the underlying denominator is asset 
preservation comprised of income tax minimization, trust 
perpetuation, and creditor protection. When properly designed 
and implemented, such specially designed trusts have proven 
extraordinarily adept at enabling trust settlors to preserve their 
wealth.  
But as trusts have evolved, new and important public policy 
concerns have emerged. These concerns include whether trusts 
should afford trust settlors the opportunity to circumvent state 
income taxes, avoid the vestiges of the remaining transfer taxes, 
and shelter trust assets from the reach of all creditors.294 In the 
prophetic words of one commentator, such trusts will “enable 
affluent people to provide their heirs with money and property 
largely free from taxes and immune to the claims of 
creditors . . . for generations in perpetuity—truly creating an 
American aristocracy.” 295 
                                                                                                     
 292. See supra Part III.B (discussing how dynasty trusts preserve wealth 
within family bloodlines). 
 293. See Waggoner, supra note 240, at 1267 (calling for Congress to prohibit 
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The proper resolution of these public policy concerns will not 
be easily achieved; nonetheless, resolution is critical. As 
evidenced by this analysis, the estate planning bar has cleverly 
pitted states against one another and sought to leverage states’ 
interests ahead of those of the federal government. This intense 
competition between and among governmental authorities makes 
the achievement of sound public policy objectives difficult. 
However, it is clear that such competition has wrought severe 
fiscal solvency issues; thus, state governments and Congress 
must take decisive actions to protect the public’s interest. If no 
action is forthcoming, trust instruments will continue to evolve in 
ways that are detrimental to societal interests, besmirching their 
otherwise venerable nature.  
